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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this study we examine how noninterest income, or fee income, affects financial 
services firms’ performance in the post Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act era. In a sample of 
bank holding companies from 2001 to 2009, we find that overall noninterest income im-
proves banks’ performance. Although some activities increase banks’ volatility and expo-
sure to systematic risk, we find evidence of economies of scope and scale, and that nonin-
terest income can improve traditional intermediation or lending activities. 
Our study expands the literature on noninterest income in two ways. First, to our 
knowledge this is one of the few studies that examine how different noninterest income 
components affect banks in the post-GLBA era. The deregulation that occurred represents 
a major shift in banking practices because it eroded long standing barriers that prevented 
banks from engaging in insurance, and securities activities. Despite this shift, DeYoung 
and Rice (2004a, b) observe that intermediation activities remain the banks’ primary fo-
cus. Accepting deposits and reinvesting the funds into loans and other credit products has 
traditionally been the primary focus of banks’ operations. While previous research fo-
cuses on portfolio theory and how correlations between noninterest activities and interest 
income affect the volatility of bank earnings, we believe a more encompassing approach 
is warranted. We not only examine noninterest income’s affect on traditional market-
based risk measures, but evaluate potential economies of scope and scale from combining 
noninterest income and intermediation activities. Finally, we test noninterest income’s 
affect on intermediation efficiency, and the liquidity and capital adequacy of the banks. 
 Results show that for large banks, noninterest income offers limited diversifica-
tion benefits for idiosyncratic and total risk. Fee income, securities activities in particular, 
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are associated with increases in systematic risk which is consistent with previous studies 
(Bhargava and Fraser, 1998; Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; Baele et al., 2007). Results for in-
terest rate risk suggest that income streams from insurance activities are exposed to fluc-
tuations in interest rates, while trading income is used as a hedging tool. 
 Many studies have suggested that some noninterest activities, insurance for ex-
ample, may have significant economies of scope or scale when combined with banking. 
Results show that insurance income reduces salaries paid per employee and increase non-
interest revenue per dollar of expense. Even though the skilled labour hired for trading 
and investment banking practices increase the average salary for employees, overall total 
noninterest income increases income per employee salary, and revenue relative to ex-
penses. For intermediation efficiency, noninterest income is associated with increases to 
return on loans, increases in the net interest margin, a reduction in credit risk, and is 
negatively related to the loan loss reserve ratio. This result is significant because it shows 
that the shift to noninterest income has a positive impact on traditional banking activities. 
Despite the more volatile nature of noninterest income streams, diversification into fee 
income provides benefits that extend beyond traditional portfolio theory and risk reduc-
tion. Finally, although some noninterest income activities may require higher levels of 
equity capital in case of unforeseen shocks, overall fee income reduces liquidity risk. 
 Consistent with previous research we find that noninterest income can increase 
certain market-based risk measures. However, there is evidence that noninterest income 
can improve the performance of banks’ traditional intermediation activities. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Noninterest income, or fee income, has been a growing portion of US banks’ in-
come for the past 40 years. In the early 1970s noninterest income represented only 20% 
of commercial bank operating income (DeYoung and Rice, 2004a).1
The motivations for our research can be separated into two categories; the rapid 
growth of noninterest income over time, and the GLBA of 1999. First, noninterest in-
come, which includes service charges and fees on deposit accounts, has grown signifi-
cantly during the latter part of the 20th century. This growth is largely attributed to im-
provements in information technologies and the banks’ ability to deliver new and im-
proved services to depositors. Despite this growth, there had not been any significant 
changes within the banking industry until deregulation occurred in 1999. The GLBA 
permits banks to expand into securities and insurance businesses, among other things. 
The combination of bank and non-bank financial firms was a topic of extreme debate 
prior to 1999, and is still today. Many of the discussions revolve around conflicts of in-
terest and concerns regarding the overall safety of the financial system when combining 
these business lines, concerns that became much more legitimate during the onset of the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007. Although noninterest income grew consistently prior 
to deregulation, the GLBA represents a major shift in the scope and scale of US banking 
practices. 
 As of 2009, thanks 
in large part to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, noninterest income makes 
up approximately 50% of the industry’s aggregate operating income and has become a 
central component of modern banking in the US. The entry into insurance and securities 
activities, and the growth of noninterest income with respect to interest income, has 
caused many researchers to question what affects noninterest income has on bank risk. 
This paper attempts to fill some of the gaps in the literature, and also expand the scope of 
research for noninterest income. 
Given that only a small number of studies have focused specifically on noninter-
est income, we believe our research contributes to the literature in several ways. To be-
gin, this is one of the only studies to our knowledge that examines noninterest income in 
                                                 
1 DeYoung and Rice (2004a) defines operating income as net interest income plus noninterest income. 
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the post-GLBA era.2 A European study by Baele et al. (2007) points out that deregulation 
occurred much later in the US. As a result, US banks have not had the same level of ex-
posure to universal banking, as their European counterparts. In addition, we are able to 
include several of the new noninterest income components provided in the FR Y-9C re-
porting forms. Prior to the GLBA, only four components of a bank holding company’s 
fee income were reported; fiduciary income, service charges, trading income, and other 
noninterest income. Beginning in 2001, banks are required to report income from many 
other noninterest income sources. Securities activities and insurance income are of par-
ticular interest given that banks were prohibited from participating in these activities for 
such a long period of time.3
This study uses annual data from the FR Y-9C reporting forms to evaluate the 
performance of BHCs with respect to noninterest income for the period 2001 to 2009. 
The two components of noninterest income we are most interested in are securities activi-
ties and insurance income, which until 1999 were prohibited by. We measure the per-
formance of banks in four areas; market-based risk, operational efficiency, intermediation 
efficiency, and liquidity and capital adequacy. To measure these areas we have gathered 
13 variables common to banking literature and practice. 
 In terms of the literature, most studies examining fee income 
argue that banks’ expansion into noninterest activities is motivated by diversification the-
ory. Consequently research in this area largely focuses on efficiency and the risk return 
trade-off. However many studies have also discussed scale and scope economies as a mo-
tivation for banks’ to engage in specific noninterest activities. Despite this, few studies 
have actually tested for economies achieved through fee income. Our study not only ex-
amines noninterest income’s effect on traditional market based risk measures, but evalu-
ates whether economies of scale are achieved through various operational efficiency 
measures. We also test how fee income has contributed to the efficiency of traditional 
intermediation activities, and the liquidity and capital adequacy of the banks. 
                                                 
2 Stiroh (2006) uses data from 1997 to 2004 to examine the relationship between noninterest income and 
equity market risk. Beginning with the 2001 data the author is able to incorporate nontraditional noninterest 
income components into the models. A more detailed discussion of noninterest income is provided in 
Chapter 2 Noninterest Income. 
3 The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restricted banks from oper-
ating securities and insurance businesses respectively; however restrictions were gradually lifted in the 
years leading up to the GLBA. A brief discussion on the history of regulation is provided in Chapter 2 
Noninterest Income. 
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For large banks in the US, total noninterest income has no impact on firm specific 
or total risk.4
The results for operational efficiency are mixed. Theories on economies of scale 
and scope appear to be consistent for insurance income. Traditional banking activities 
provide the networks and skilled employees necessary to distribute and sell insurance 
products efficiently, which lowers the overall cost per employee. Conversely, securities 
activities and trading income increase the operational risk of banks. These activities cre-
ate few synergies with retail banking and require a highly skilled work force with signifi-
cantly higher salaries. However, overall noninterest activities decrease noninterest ex-
penses relative to revenues, and increases income per dollar of employee salary.. 
 Given that big banks derive a larger proportion of their income from nonin-
terest activities, it appears as though diversification benefits are realized with lower 
weights of noninterest income. Securities activities are also insignificant however insur-
ance income is associated with reductions in idiosyncratic and total volatility. The results 
for systematic risk are as expected. Overall noninterest income is positively related to 
market risk. This result is driven largely by securities activities and securitization income, 
which other authors have identified as being highly cyclical and correlated with the mar-
ket (Bhargava and Fraser (1998), Allen and Jagtiani (2000), and Baele et al. (2007)). In-
surance income is negatively related to market risk, a result that suggests insurance ac-
tivities are consistent and provide a smooth income stream that is unaffected by market 
fluctuations. Finally, insurance is positively related to increases in interest rate risk, while 
trading activities are negatively related to interest rate risk.. 
Traditional banking, or intermediation activity, is significantly enhanced by non-
interest income. Noninterest income is positively related to increases in the net interest 
margin, increases in return on loan, and decreases in credit risk. In addition, many nonin-
terest components are negatively related to the loan loss reserve ratio. These results sug-
gest that banks diversifying into noninterest activities have more efficient intermediation 
services. It is possible that banks with a broader range of revenue sources are less de-
pendent on interest income. As such, diversified banks can issue loans, mortgages, and 
                                                 
4 In our sample, we define large banks as the largest 25% of banks by asset size in any given year. Previous 
studies observe that noninterest income is primarily a large bank phenomenon (Rogers and Sinkey, 1999; 
DeYoung and Rice, 2004a, b; Stiroh, 2004; Baele et al., 2007). We use results from Figure 2 to analyze 
trends for noninterest income with respect to bank size in order to construct our sample. A more detailed 
discussion is provided in Chapter 4 Data. 
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credit cards to only the most creditworthy clients, thus reducing default rates and increas-
ing returns. Alternatively banks could benefit from operating related activities. Combin-
ing information and expertise from several product groups may result in economies of 
scope and scale that enhance banks’ business lines.  
For liquidity risk, as banks shift operations away from traditional intermediation 
activities and towards noninterest income, there is less reliance on customer deposits. The 
results for equity capital show that banks engaging in securitization and securities activi-
ties carry larger amounts of equity on their balance sheets. Banks appear to be following 
safe practices by carrying more capital for activities exposed to higher amounts of market 
risk. Conversely, insurance is negatively related to equity capital, once again confirming 
the relative stability of this income stream. 
Although previous studies have shown that noninterest income is more volatile 
than interest income, and decreases the risk-adjusted profits of the banks, our results sug-
gest noninterest income can have a positive effect on banks’ operations. While some non-
interest activities increase the sensitivity of banks’ returns with the market, overall there 
is little to no increase in total volatility. In addition, noninterest income improves not only 
operational efficiency, but enhances traditional lending practices. Finally, noninterest in-
come reduces the banks’ dependence on customer deposits, which decreases liquidity 
risk, and banks are able to adjust capital reserves for more volatile operations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the devel-
opment of noninterest income with respect to technology and deregulation. Section 3 out-
lines the literature and formulates the hypotheses. Section 4 reviews the data for our 
study. Section 5 explains the methodology. Section 6 discusses the results and robustness 
tests. Section 7 concludes our study. 
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CHAPTER 2: NONINTEREST INCOME 
 
2.1 Traditional and non-traditional noninterest income 
The primary source of a bank’s earnings is derived from intermediation activities. 
This is the typical lending relationship where a bank accepts funds from the public, com-
pensates them with a rate on their deposits, and reinvests the money for a higher return. 
This is known as interest income. Noninterest income, or fee income, refers to the earn-
ings of the bank that are not directly related to interest activities. Examples of noninterest 
income include service charges on deposit accounts, fiduciary income, and servicing fees. 
According to DeYoung & Rice (2004a, b) the former are considered traditional noninter-
est income components because banks have earned revenues from these sources for many 
years. Nearly all deposit taking institutions will derive significant portions of operating 
income from traditional noninterest activities. Monthly or annual fees for deposit ac-
counts, service charges for transactions, safety deposit box fees, and any fees earned in a 
fiduciary capacity are specific examples of traditional noninterest income.  
Non-traditional noninterest activities, as the term implies, includes fee income 
that banks have only recently begun to collect. Venture capital, securitization, and trading 
are some of the non-traditional noninterest activities that the banking industry has ex-
plored in recent years. Two of the more important non-traditional noninterest income 
components for banks today are insurance and investment banking. Recently, bancassur-
ance (combination of banking and insurance) and the re-entry of banks into the securities 
market have been two prominent topics in financial institutions research. This is largely 
motivated by the deregulation that occurred throughout the 80s and 90s culminating with 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 that granted banks freedoms not seen 
since the Great Depression. 
The growth of noninterest income can be clearly separated into two stages; the 
growth of traditional activities throughout the late 1900s, and the introduction of non-
traditional activities in the post GLBA era. A brief discussion of each will follow. 
2.2 Traditional noninterest income and technology 
Although intermediation activities continue to be the central focus for banks’ op-
erations, DeYoung and Rice (2004a, b) recognize the increasing importance of fee in-
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come. In the late 1970s noninterest income represented 20% of bank operating revenues. 
DeYoung and Rice (2004a) show that by 2000 this ratio doubled to approximately 40%. 
The steady rise in noninterest income over this 20 year period represents an increase in 
traditional noninterest activities. DeYoung & Rice (2004a, b) argue that banks have bene-
fited from advances in information and communications technology that created new op-
portunities for fee income. Where banks previously collected deposit account fees pri-
marily for safe-keeping and checking services, they now also collect fees for internet 
banking and ATM use. There have also been innovations in lending practices where 
banks can provide noninterest activities ranging from loan securitization to credit scoring. 
The authors further argue that the expansion into such financial instruments as high-yield 
bonds, commercial paper, and financial derivatives can be partially attributed to im-
provements in technology. Globalization has certainly impacted the ease with which we 
can access information, increasing the liquidity of markets, and providing banks with 
more opportunities to collect fees. 
2.3 Deregulation and non-traditional noninterest income 
The GLBA of 1999 negated many of the restrictions imposed on the financial in-
dustry, allowing banks to pursue non-traditional noninterest activities like insurance and 
investment banking. Due to the impact the GLBA had on the banking industry, and its 
importance with respect to this study, a brief discussion on the history of banking regula-
tions should be included. 
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was enacted in order to separate commercial 
banking from security services. At the time, the combination of commercial banking with 
security activities was perceived as risky, and as a result of the Pecora committee was 
thought to be one of the causes of the 1929 Stock Market Crash.5
                                                 
5 The Pecora committee, led by Ferdinand Pecora, involved hearings related to two banks; The First 
National Bank and The Chase Bank. The two banks were accused of misinterpreting the quality of security 
issues to public investors. These events were key factors that lead to the introduction of the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933. 
 The main concern was 
the potential for agency issues arising when a bank underwrites securities for a corpora-
tion with which the bank already has a lending relationship. As Puri (1996) notes, credi-
tors tend to acquire private information through their lending practices that is not avail-
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able to other market participants. If the bank also acts as underwriter, the bank could use 
this private information for personal gain. For example, as part of the underwriting 
agreement the bank could require that a risky corporation use a portion of the proceeds 
from an IPO to pay-off outstanding loans. In this case, the bank is protecting their inter-
ests at the expense of outsiders who invest in the new issue without the same private in-
formation that the bank has acquired.  
The next major piece of regulation was the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. 
This piece of regulation prohibited a bank holding company (BHC) from underwriting 
insurance. This represented one of the most restrictive times in modern banking history 
for the US. However in the 1980s, banking regulations began to relax. The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 had several key 
elements in it. The first title of the Act extended the Federal Reserve System (FRS) con-
trol over reserves to all depository institutions. Previously, savings banks, savings and 
loans, credit unions, and other non-FRS members were thought to have benefited from 
the lack of regulatory restrictions governing their activities. Subsequently, reserve re-
quirements would be set at uniform rates for all depository institutions removing any 
competitive advantages certain institutions held over others. The second title phased out 
Regulation Q, eliminating interest rate ceilings imposed on the banking industry. Al-
though DIDMCA had few direct implications for noninterest income, the Act was a step-
ping stone for deregulation that would change the landscape of banking practices in the 
US. 
Concessions were made in the late 1980s for banks eager to once again under-
write securities. In 1987, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve granted limited 
(up to 5% of gross revenues) underwriting abilities of municipal bonds to a number of 
banks. On January 18th 1989, the Federal Reserve authorized BHCs to underwrite corpo-
rate debt and equity. Underwriting corporate securities was viewed as risky and the main 
reason for the Glass-Steagall Act; however, only banks that met financial standards set by 
the BHC Act could engage in these activities. In the fall of 1989 the limit on underwriting 
revenues was subsequently raised to 10%, and in 1996 was increased again to 25%. This 
led to the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which allowed all BHCs the 
freedom to engage in security services and insurance activities. As of 2009, insurance and 
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investment banking income make up more than 30% of total noninterest income on aver-
age, and following the passage of the GLBA total noninterest income has grown to half 
of bank operating income. 
 
= = = = = Insert Figure 1 Here = = = = = 
 
Prior to 1999, not all BHCs were permitted to offer security and insurance ser-
vices. Now in the post-GLBA era, these two activities have become major sources of in-
come for the banking industry. Given the rapid growth of noninterest income in recent 
years, how has this affected bank risk? More specifically, how has the entrance into in-
surance and security services affected bank performance? 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section we address the motivations and theories for noninterest income. 
However, literature in this area is sparse. Only a handful of studies specifically target 
noninterest income, most likely because until recent deregulation in the US banking in-
dustry data was not readily availability for specific noninterest activities. On the other 
hand, there have been countless studies examining mergers in the banking industry, espe-
cially in the years leading up to the GLBA when banks were expanding into securities 
and insurance. For this reason we separate the literature into four categories. First we will 
review a broad set of literature related to noninterest income and bank diversification. 
The next two sections will review the literature related to securities activities and insur-
ance. The fourth section will tie the remaining literature together to form the hypotheses 
for our study. 
3.1 Noninterest income 
Size is perhaps one of the most important bank characteristics when discussing 
noninterest income. It is widely held within the literature that noninterest income activi-
ties are driven by the larger institutions. Rogers and Sinkey (1999) observe that some in-
stitutions are incapable of producing certain categories of noninterest income, such as 
trading, because of the economies of scale that are required for these activities. DeYoung 
and Rice (2004a, b) suggest insurance and securitization activities also enjoy economies 
of scale. Intuitively, having a larger client base means there are more opportunities to sell 
insurance products, which are relatively costless to sell if a network is already in place to 
distribute them. In addition, having more clients almost certainly implies access to a lar-
ger pool of mortgages and loans that banks can package up and sell. Elsas et al. (2010) 
looks at international data and finds that when diversification occurs for related activities 
within a bank, economies of scope do exist. Given the importance of size, scale, and 
scope, we should first review some preliminary research about bank mergers. 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992) examine 30 bank mergers between 1982 and 1987 
and find superior cash flow returns on assets for the merged sample. The authors examine 
accounting information and conclude that improvements in cash flow can be attributed to 
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the banks’ abilities to attract loans and deposits, asset growth, and employee productivity. 
Benston et al. (1995) look at the motivations behind bank mergers and test two theories; 
the “deposit insurance put-option-enhancing” theory essentially refers to the “too big to 
fail” doctrine, and the second theory is that banks seek to maximize shareholder wealth 
by diversifying their earnings and minimizing risk.6 The authors find evidence in support 
of the diversification hypothesis that mergers create net cash-flow advantages, which 
supports the diversification hypothesis. Allen and Jagtiani (2000) find additional support 
for diversification by examining the impact on risk of synthetically built universal banks 
from 1986 to 1994.7
Rogers (1998) looks at noninterest income and efficiency of US commercial 
banks. By estimating cost, revenue, and profit frontiers the author determines where the 
gains or losses in efficiency are derived. The results show that banks with noninterest in-
come are more efficient than those without. In addition, the gains are derived primarily 
from cost efficiency. The authors conclude that any study examining bank efficiency 
must consider noninterest activities. Rogers and Sinkey (1999) examine some fundamen-
tal bank characteristics and how they are related to fee income. Their results show that 
banks that engage in noninterest activities are larger, have smaller core deposits, and have 
smaller net interest margins. The authors argue that larger banks, which face more com-
petition, are less profitable from intermediation activities, and diversification into nonin-
terest income can offset these losses. They also find that fee income is related to a reduc-
tion in various accounting risk measures. DeYoung and Roland (2001) find that as banks 
shift away from traditional intermediation activities and into fee-based services, the vola-
tility of earnings increases. More specifically, fee income appears to increase revenue 
volatility and the degree of total leverage. However, the authors also find an increase in 
 Overall, their results show that universal banks have lower return 
volatility compared to individual banks. The merger literature suggests that cash-flow and 
diversification benefits are possible when combining activities where synergies exist. 
                                                 
6 The “deposit insurance put-option-enhancing” theory follows that banks seek to become larger in order to 
increase the probability that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will cover all of the bank’s 
deposits. See Boyd and Graham (1991) for a more detailed discussion on this topic. 
7 Allen and Jagtiani (2000) create portfolios combining one depository institution, one securities firm, and 
one insurance company. The authors select the nine largest of each firm by asset size, and create every 
combination possible for a total of 729 synthetic universal banks. 
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profitability associated with fee income that partially compensates banks for the increase 
in risk. 
A European study by Baele et al. (2007) explores the question of whether or not 
investors value diversification. In this study, the authors examine 255 European banks 
from 1989 to 2004 and observe what effects noninterest income has on risk and bank 
value. Results show that increasing the proportion of noninterest income increases bank 
value. The stock market anticipates some positive net benefit from banks earning multi-
ple streams of income. On the risk side, firm betas increase as banks use more noninterest 
income, suggesting that as banks diversify they become more reliant on economy-wide 
shocks. Idiosyncratic and total risk is negatively related to noninterest activities for the 
majority of the sample. However, the authors note that the European results may not hold 
in other markets because deregulation occurred much earlier in Europe. The Second 
Banking Coordination Directive took place in 1989 and it was meant to foster competi-
tion among the European banking community. In addition to introducing regulatory and 
supervisory standards, the Directive also laid the ground work for functional diversifica-
tion by allowing banks to form conglomerates combining commercial banking, securities, 
insurance, and other financial services. In later years the regulations were adjusted in or-
der to harmonize the functionally diversified areas. As such, these banks are not only bet-
ter equipped and more experienced with functional diversification, but are also engaged 
in far more nonbank activities than their American counterparts. 
Stiroh (2004) decomposes noninterest income into four components – service 
charges, trading, fiduciary, and other noninterest income – and examines what impact 
each activity has on risk adjusted returns. Overall, noninterest income decreases risk ad-
justed profits. This result is largely driven by trading activities and other noninterest in-
come because of their high volatility relative to returns. Fiduciary income proved to be 
the only component of noninterest income positively related to risk-adjusted profits. 
DeYoung and Rice (2004a, b) perform a qualitative and quantitative analysis of noninter-
est income. First, the authors note that the growth of noninterest income has produced 
some misleading facts. While noninterest income is becoming an increasing portion of 
the banking industry’s operating income, the majority of this increase is attributed to 
payment related services. That is, for the average bank, roughly two thirds of noninterest 
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income is derived from traditional noninterest activities that are related to intermediation 
services. In addition, the shift to noninterest income has provided banks with higher prof-
its, more variable profits, and a worsening of the risk return trade-off. The authors sug-
gest that while noninterest income is becoming increasingly important for the banking 
industry, intermediation activities will continue to be the central focus of banks. 
3.2 Insurance income 
Boyd and Graham (1988) simulate mergers between banks and non-bank financial 
companies from 1971 to 1984. The authors find that bank mergers with insurance agents 
and brokers, property and casualty insurers, and life insurers are the least risky. However, 
for the latter category of mergers, risk only decreases when market measures are used. 
When accounting based risk measures are used, bank and insurance mergers appear to 
increase risk. Similarly, Lown et al. (2000) construct pro-forma mergers between BHCs 
and other financial services firms. The authors find that the largest diversification bene-
fits are derived from bank holding companies combined with life insurance firms. Con-
sistent with the previous results, Estrella (2001) examines what types of mergers would 
be most effective for banks and finds strong diversification benefits for bank and insur-
ance mergers, especially among property and casualty insurance. Allen and Jagtiani 
(2000) find that among a group of synthetically built universal banks, insurance activities 
appear to have no effect on systematic risk, while decreasing interest rate risk. Fields et 
al. (2007) look at mergers between insurance firms and banks from 1997 to 2002 and find 
that markets respond positively to bancassurance merger announcements. In addition to 
the bidder’s positive abnormal returns, the authors observe insignificant results for both 
standard deviation and beta indicating that bancassurance mergers have no effect on mar-
ket based risk characteristics. 
3.3 Income from securities activities 
An argument against the combination of securities services with banks is the po-
tential for conflicts of interest. In the past, concerns arose from the fear that banks would 
dump low quality securities on the public while at the same time requiring that firms re-
pay outstanding loans to the banks with proceeds from the new issue. In an attempt to test 
this theory, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) compare the performance of security issues be-
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tween commercial banks and independent investment banks from 1921 to 1933, prior to 
the Glass-Steagall Act. The authors find no evidence that commercial banks attempted to 
fool the public with low quality securities, and conclude that commercial banks appeared 
to underwrite higher quality securities that were not overpriced. Ang and Richardson 
(1994) found similar results with bond issues. Although there were isolated cases of 
poorly issued securities, the authors find no evidence that the bonds underwritten by bank 
affiliates were in any way inferior to those underwritten by investment banks. Puri (1999) 
develops a theoretical framework to test security issuance and finds that commercial 
banks with prior financial claims enables banks to acquire better prices for underwritten 
securities compared to independent investment banks. The previous result is even 
stronger when information collection costs are high. Puri (1999) concludes that banks 
rely on their informational advantages to more accurately price securities. This “certifica-
tion role” of the bank is enhanced when securities are priced accurately, which in turn 
increases the bank’s reputation. White (1986) examines banks during the Great Depres-
sion and tests the failure rates of banks with securities affiliates. The results show that 
significantly fewer banks with affiliates failed during the ensuing market crash. This re-
sult could be partly attributed to the fact that banks attracted to securities activities were 
primarily larger institutions, while the majority of banks that failed were on average 
smaller. In addition, the author finds that securities affiliates did not cause a systematic 
dismantling of national banks’ capital or liquidity positions. 
Although the literature seems to refute the idea that conflicts of interest are not as 
prominent as prior expectations had indicated, many studies show that securities activities 
still increase overall volatility in the banking industry. With their simulated mergers, 
Boyd and Graham (1988) found bank mergers with securities firms and real estate devel-
opment firms to be among the most risky. Consistent with the previous study, Allen and 
Jagtiani (2000) found that securities firms increased both systematic risk and interest rate 
risk when combined with banking and insurance activities. 
However some studies provide mixed or positive results. A study by Kwan (1997) 
looks at the performance of banks with approved Section 20 subsidiaries from 1990 to 
1997 and compares various return and risk measures between the Section 20s and their 
affiliates. The author finds that the securities subsidiaries appear to be riskier than the af-
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filiates but not more profitable. Conversely, low return correlations between the two 
samples suggest there are diversification benefits. Another study looking at Section 20 
subsidiaries by Bhargava and Fraser (1998) shows that originally the market perceived 
positive wealth effects for banks approved to underwrite securities. Later, when the 
Board of Governors authorized banks to underwrite corporate debt and equity the market 
reacted negatively, with negative abnormal returns and increases in firm specific and total 
risk. Finally, Cornett et al. (2002) look at the performance of 40 commercial banks from 
1987 to 1997 that began underwriting securities through a Section 20 subsidiary. Com-
pared to non-Section 20 banks and investment banks, the newly diversified banks had 
superior cash flow performance. This improvement in cash flow is attributed to increased 
revenue from the new lines of business. In addition, the authors find that none of the risk 
measures increased significantly with the introduction of Section 20s. 
3.4.1 Hypotheses – Market-based risk 
 Our main research questions are concerned with how noninterest income as a 
whole, insurance activities, and securities activities, affect bank risk and performance. 
We test how these three factors affect a set of commonly tested market-based risk meas-
ures; idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, total risk, and interest rate risk. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 1 Here = = = = = 
 
Idiosyncratic risk, or firm specific volatility, is the portion of risk directly attrib-
uted to a company irrespective of market or any other fluctuations. In the framework of 
this study, we can also break down firm specific risk into several components. If we as-
sume that banks are portfolios, earning income from several different sources of nonin-
terest income, then we can apply portfolio theory, which tells us that as long as two secu-
rities are not perfectly correlated there is the potential for risk reducing effects. Given our 
results from Table 1, we see the majority of the correlations between net interest income 
and noninterest income components are relatively small therefore: 
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Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between a BHC’s idiosyncratic risk and – 
noninterest income, insurance, and securities activities. 
 
 Market risk, or systematic risk, is attributed to fluctuations in the market. It is es-
sentially a measure of how correlated a firm is with the market. Noninterest income is 
primarily fee-based and as DeYoung and Rice (2004a, b) point out, for clients these types 
of services have very low switching costs. Although monthly charges on deposit accounts 
are relatively sticky, service charges and other fee-based activities can be quite sensitive 
to economy wide fluctuations. Similarly, Baele et al. (2007) argues that more diversified 
banks will be more exposed to market-wide volatility. Activities like investment banking 
are subject to economy wide shocks, and should therefore increase the market risk of 
banks. Myers and Majluf (1984) note that managers prefer not to issue stock when the 
firm is undervalued. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between a BHC’s market risk and – nonin-
terest income and securities activities. 
 
 Total risk is calculated as the standard deviation of stock returns, and is consid-
ered the sum of idiosyncratic and market risk. In order to formulate accurate predictions 
about total risk, we need to consider how prominent a role each component of risk repre-
sents. Like firm specific risk, total risk can be thought of as a sum of all the risky compo-
nents of the firm, including systematic risk. As the firm diversifies across product lines 
and acquires new income streams, we expect idiosyncratic risk to decrease, however sys-
tematic risk can either increase or decrease depending on the correlation a particular ac-
tivity has with the market. Holding the return on the market constant, we can assume that 
the more diversified firm will be the least risky. In addition, previous empirical studies 
show that idiosyncratic risk is the dominate portion of total risk (Anderson and Fraser, 
2000; Chen et al., 2006; Baele et al., 2007). Therefore our hypothesis with regards to 
idiosyncratic risk should hold for total risk. 
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Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between a BHC’s total risk and – nonin-
terest income, insurance, and securities activities. 
 
 Interest rate risk is the risk attributed to a security’s return given that interest rates 
fluctuate. This form of risk is most prominent in the banking industry given the amount 
of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet that are subject to interest rates. Due in large 
part to the introduction of new financial instruments in recent years, banks are able to use 
derivative contracts to hedge interest rate risk, and match the payments of liabilities and 
assets. However, outside of trading, the majority of noninterest activities represent one 
time fees that are not subject to fluctuations in interest rates. 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between a BHC’s interest rate risk and – 
trading income. 
3.4.2 Hypotheses – Operational efficiency 
In addition to market perceptions, we want to investigate how noninterest income 
affects banks’ operations in terms of economies of scope, and what implications this has 
for employees and profits. There are several noninterest activities that require few addi-
tional employees, or only require minimal labour costs. Once an account is opened at the 
bank, many service charges and fees accumulate without the presence of an employee 
(deposit accounts, ATMs, online banking service fees, etc.). Looking at other components 
of noninterest income, Rogers and Sinkey (1999), DeYoung and Rice (2004a, b), and El-
sas et al. (2010), find that insurance activities offer cross-selling opportunities and have 
potential to build economies of scope and scale. Conversely, it is widely held that in-
vestment bankers and traders earn very lucrative salaries and bonuses. These types of 
employees also have little to do with the retail side of the bank, therefore fewer synergies 
may exist between securities activities and intermediation activities compared to the effi-
ciencies captured by insurance income. 
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Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between a BHC’s operational efficiency 
and insurance income. There is a negative relationship between a BHC’s 
operational efficiency and securities activities. 
3.4.3 Hypotheses – Intermediation efficiency 
 Intermediation efficiency can be thought of as proxies for the performance of tra-
ditional lending activities. As it is, there is little economic rationale as to how noninterest 
activities should affect this area of the bank. One theory, proposed by Rogers and Sinkey 
(1999) is that some banks have been forced to expand into non-traditional activities be-
cause of reduced net interest margins. This suggests that banks are competing for cus-
tomers based on price, and subsidizing the decreases in profit by diversifying into nonin-
terest income. Conversely, Lown et al. (2000) suggest that diversification benefits real-
ized from noninterest activities, allows banks to pursue riskier loans, therefore achieving 
higher returns. 
Cole (1998) finds that existing relationships increase the probability that credit 
will be extended, and emphasizes the importance of information collection by banks. If 
banks can offer full-service banking to its customers and encourage one stop shopping, 
larger more diversified banks will have informational advantages that will allow them to 
more accurately price credit and achieve more consistent returns. If we follow Lown et al 
(2000) and Cole (1998), noninterest income should be expected to improve intermedia-
tion activities. 
 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between the efficiency of a BHC’s inter-
mediation efficiency and noninterest income. 
3.4.4 Hypotheses – Liquidity and capital adequacy 
 Capital adequacy and liquidity risk (Equity to assets, liquidity risk): Core capital, 
or equity to assets, from a regulator’s point of view is one of the most important indica-
tors of a bank’s financial strength. Given what happened during the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis, and the amount of debt banks carry on their balance sheets, the restrictions on tier 
1 capital are likely to become stricter. Banks pursing securities activities, trading, securi-
tization, and any other activities without fixed payments are deemed more risky and 
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should therefore have higher capital requirements. Liquidity risk on the other hand is 
highly correlated with accepting customer deposits. Since trading, insurance, securities 
activities and other components of noninterest income have little to do with customer de-
posits we assume that increases in noninterest activities should decrease liquidity risk. 
 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between a BHC’s ratio of equity to assets 
and noninterest income. 
Hypothesis 8: There is a negative relationship between a BHC’s liquidity risk and nonin-
terest income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
19 
 
CHAPTER 4: DATA 
 
4.1 FR Y-9C reporting forms 
Our primary source of data is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s FR Y-
9C database. The reports are required, by law, to be filed by Bank Holding Companies in 
the United States and provide detailed information of BHCs’ balance sheet and income 
statement items. Due to the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 all BHCs 
are now eligible to engage in insurance and securities activities, and beginning in 2001 all 
BHCs filing FR Y-9C forms are required to report income derived from any of 12 differ-
ent categories of noninterest income.8
 As with other studies, we recognize the importance of size when studying nonin-
terest income. To determine an appropriate sample for this study we graph noninterest 
income (as a percentage of operating income) as a function of asset size across our nine 
year study period. 
 While other authors have studied the components 
of noninterest income prior to 2001, to our knowledge few other studies have used this 
dataset which contains the yearly revenues derived from insurance, securities activities, 
and all other noninterest income components. Consistent with previous studies we use 
annual data from 2001 to 2009, because quarterly data is unaudited (DeYoung & Rice, 
2004a, b; Stiroh, 2004). In 2006 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve changed 
the requirements for the FR Y-9C reporting forms. In previous years only Bank Holding 
Companies with $150 million or more in consolidated assets were required to report. In 
2006 this number was changed to $500 million. Banks with assets smaller than $500 mil-
lion submit FR Y-9SP reports which do not contain the relevant noninterest income in-
formation required for this study.  In order to remain consistent we include only firms 
with $500 million or more in consolidated assets throughout our study period. After ad-
justments we are left with a sample of 7276 observations across nine years. 
 
= = = = = Insert Figure 2 Here = = = = = 
 
                                                 
8 Prior to 2001 there were four categories of noninterest income; fiduciary, service charges, trading, other 
noninterest income. As of the 2009 reporting forms there are 15 categories. 
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 In the graph we see a sharp increase in the proportion of noninterest income for 
banks in the 76 to 80th percentile of assets. We find similar results when we graph securi-
ties activities as a percentage of noninterest income.9
4.2 CRSP database 
 Therefore, our final sample is con-
structed by using the largest 25% of banks in any given year. This leaves our sample 
from the FR Y-9C with 1828 bank year observations. 
Daily stock return data is collected from the Centre for Research in Security Pric-
es (CRSP) database. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides a list of BHC enti-
ty numbers from the FR Y-9C that matches with CRSP’s PERMCO identification num-
bers. We use this list to extract the daily returns of BHCs in our original dataset from the 
CRSP database. Due to liquidity concerns, we follow Esty (1997) and Anderson & Fraser 
(2000) and discard any BHC whose equity was not traded for 75 days or more during a 
year.10
 
 We also collect the equally weighted CRSP index returns. Interest rate data for 
this study comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We follow Flannery and 
James (1984), Sweeney and Warga (1986), Saunders and Yourougou (1990), Yourougou 
(1990), Flannery et al. (1997), Allen and Jagtiani (2000), Chen et al. (2006) and estimate 
the following two-factor model model: 
Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit         (1) 
 
where Rit is the daily stock return of the BHCs, α is the intercept term, RMit is the daily 
return of the equally weighted CRSP index, Iit is the daily three month treasury-bill yield, 
and eit is a random error term. βM is Beta or the systematic risk estimate, and βI is a proxy 
for interest rate risk. Proxies for total risk and idiosyncratic risk are obtained by calculat-
ing volatility of the daily stock returns (σRi) and volatility of the residuals (σei). 
 
                                                 
9 When we graph insurance income as a percentage of noninterest income as a function of asset size the 
graph was relatively flat with a sharp increase for the top 5% of banks. 
10 In our sample there is roughly 250 trading days in any given year. Therefore only stocks that trade 70% 
of the year are included in our sample. 
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
 
To examine the impact of noninterest income and its components on bank per-
formance we estimate the following specifications: 
 
yit = α + β1 Non_IIit + β2 d_eit + β3 lnAssetsit + ∑γ Year Dummy + εit     (2) 
yit = α + β1 Insuranceit + β2 d_eit + β3 lnAssetsit + ∑γ Year Dummy + εit           (3) 
yit = α + β1 I_Bankingit + β2 d_eit + β3 lnAssetsit + ∑γ Year Dummy + εit           (4) 
yit = α + β1 Insuranceit + β2 I_Bankingit + β3 Service_Chargeit + β4 Tradingit      (5)  
+ β5 Securitizationit + β6 Other_NonIIit + β7 d_eit + β8 lnAssetsit + ∑γ Year Dummy + εit 
 
where yit represents one of our 13 performance measures in Figure 3. In the first three 
specifications we test each of our independent variables individually. Non_IIit, Insur-
anceit, and I_Bankingit are noninterest income, insurance income, and investment banking 
income, all scaled by total assets. In each of our regressions we also control for capital 
structure using the debt to equity ratio (d_eit), size by taking the natural log of total assets 
(lnAssetsit), and fixed year effects by using dummy variables for the years 2002 to 2009 
(∑γ Year Dummy). εit is the error term. 
 
= = = = = Insert Figure 3 Here = = = = = 
 
In equation (5) we stack several components of noninterest income together to 
control for other sources of income and for robustness.11
                                                 
11 Noninterest income is not included in equation (5) because of the high correlations that exist between it 
and other noninterest income components. 
 The other four components of 
noninterest income we chose to include in the model are service charges on deposit ac-
counts (Service_Chargeit), trading income (Tradingit), securitization income (Securitiza-
tionit), and (Other_NonIIit). Service charges represent traditional noninterest activities and 
are one of the largest components of fee income. DeYoung and Rice (2004a, b) identify 
service charges as the component of noninterest income most closely linked to interest 
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activities. In addition, empirical evidence from Stiroh (2004) shows that among noninter-
est income components, interest income growth shows the highest correlation with ser-
vice charges. Trading income is included for two reasons. First, outside of securities ac-
tivities and insurance, trading activities represent one of the most controversial activities 
banks engage in. It could be argued that trading was directly responsible for both the sav-
ings and loans crisis in the 1980s, and the sub-prime mortgage crisis which began in 
2007. Secondly, trading income is very volatile. Stiroh (2004) identifies trading activities 
as the most volatile component of noninterest income, and has the largest negative impact 
on risk adjusted profits. Securitization is included primarily out of interest due to the sub-
prime mortgage crisis. We should caution that all noninterest income components repre-
sent fee income that banks earn on an annual basis from these activities. Securitization 
does not represent the banks position with respect to securitized assets, it simply reflects 
the amount of fee income that banks earn from securitization activities.12
 
 Finally other 
noninterest income is included because of its sheer size with respect to noninterest in-
come. In any given year it represents approximately 25% of noninterest income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 A complete list of noninterest income components and their definitions from the FR Y-9C reporting 
forms are included in Appendix 2. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Given that our samples are different for our market and accounting based sam-
ples, we provide summary statistics and correlation tables for both. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 2 Here = = = = = 
= = = = = Insert Table 3 Here = = = = = 
= = = = = Insert Table 4 Here = = = = = 
 
 Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our first sample using market-based risk 
measures, and in total we have 712 observations across nine years. The smallest bank in 
our sample by total asset size is almost 6 billion, the largest is 2.2 trillion, and the average 
bank is approximately 100 billion. Table 2 includes the summary statistics for the ac-
counting-based sample which includes 1828 observations. With this sample the smallest 
bank has assets of just over 2 billion, the largest bank is still 2.2 trillion, and the average 
bank is approximately 62 billion. The minimum size of banks in both our samples is simi-
lar to Stiroh (2004), who divided his sample by taking banks with assets in excess of 1 
billion. Table 3 lists the number of banks by year in each of our samples. 
 Table 4 and Table 5 present the Pearson Correlation Matrix for both samples. 
Consistent with our expectations, the highest correlations in the tables exist between non-
interest income and several of the components, which is why we do not include total non-
interest income in equation (5). There are also negative correlations between the debt to 
equity ratio and both noninterest income, and investment banking activities. However, 
this is expected because interest income is derived from liabilities (deposits which are 
turned into loans), whereas many noninterest income components represent off-balance 
sheet activity. In addition, riskier banks are required to have more equity capital, and as 
mentioned many noninterest activities are more volatile than traditional banking. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 5 Here = = = = = 
= = = = = Insert Table 6 Here = = = = = 
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6.2 Results – Market-based risk 
 Table 6.1 contains the results for the idiosyncratic risk regressions. Banks that de-
rive more of their income from insurance activities have lower firm specific risk. This 
result is consistent when we test insurance individually in Column 2 and in the stacked 
regression in Column 4 (statistical significance increases to 1% in the stacked regression 
when we include other noninterest income variables). However securities activities and 
total noninterest income show no statistical significance in any of the regressions. Given 
that our sample consists of the large banks, which proportionately earn larger sums of fee 
income, it is possible that these BHCs have already reached the optimal amount of nonin-
terest activities in which to reduce firm specific risk.13
 
 For each component of noninterest 
income, depending on the volatility and covariance of securities services with other bank 
income streams, the majority of the diversification benefits could be realized with smaller 
weights. Service charges, the component most closely aligned with traditional interme-
diation activities, are negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. Given that annual fees for 
deposit accounts are collected on a continuous basis and rates rarely fluctuate, the nega-
tive coefficient for service charges is consistent with the low volatility of this activity. 
= = = = = Insert Table 7.1 Here = = = = = 
 
 In Table 6.1 we also include the coefficients for our year dummies. With 2001 as 
the base year, we observe a steady decrease in firm specific risk from 2002 to 2004 fol-
lowed by a steady period from 2005 to 2006. The coefficient for our 2007 dummy is in-
significant and in 2008 and 2009 the sign changes. We believe this portrays a fairly accu-
rate story with respect to firm specific risk in banks during this time period. We know 
during the crisis period, beginning in 2007, many customers began defaulting on loans 
which could account for the increase in idiosyncratic risk during this time period. 
 Table 6.2 presents the results from the regressions with systematic risk. As ex-
pected, total noninterest income has a positive relationship with beta. We also find a posi-
tive relationship between beta and securities activities. These results are consistent with 
                                                 
13 In section 6.6 Robustness tests, we test this for this possibility by including the full sample of banks in 
our regressions. We also test the smallest banks from the original sample and find evidence that at lower 
weights i_banking and noninterest income provide diversification benefits. 
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Bhargava and Fraser (1998), Allen and Jagtiani (2000), and Baele et al. (2007) which 
confirms the expectation that as banks diversify their income they will have higher expo-
sure to changes in the market, or economy-wide shocks. This argument is particularly 
relevant with respect to investment banking activities, where the execution of IPOs and 
mergers and acquisitions are highly dependent on market timing. Insurance activities 
show a negative relationship with market risk. Our results are consistent with Biger and 
Kahane (1978) who find that the betas of almost all insurance lines are no different from 
zero. Insurance activities appear to provide smooth income streams that do not fluctuate 
with the market, however given that the significance on the insurance coefficient changes 
from columns 2 to 4 conclusions should be drawn cautiously. Similar to the results for 
idiosyncratic risk, service charges decrease market risk while securitization increases it. 
The year dummies from Table 6.2 explain a similar story from the previous regression. 
Although the pattern from 2002 to 2006 is somewhat sporadic, from 2007 to 2009 we ob-
serve an upward trend in systematic risk which clearly reflects events during that time 
period. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 7.2 Here = = = = = 
= = = = = Insert Table 7.3 Here = = = = = 
 
The results for the regressions with standard deviation are reported in Table 6.3. 
Total risk can be thought of as the sum of all risky components calculated from equation 
(1) which includes market, idiosyncratic, and interest rate risk. Consistent with other 
studies (Bhargava and Fraser, 1998; Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; Baele et al., 2007) we ob-
serve that total risk is primarily driven by the idiosyncratic portion. Insurance and service 
charges are negatively related to total risk, while securitization is associated with in-
creases in standard deviation. The year dummies display the same pattern as in our idio-
syncratic regressions. 
We observe consistent results for our control variables across the first three re-
gressions. Increases in leverage are associated with increases in firm specific, market, and 
total risk. The more debt a bank carries the riskier it is. However, size is not statistically 
significant in any of our regressions. Although size is widely recognized in the literature 
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as one of the most important predictors of noninterest income, we have already controlled 
for it by including only the largest 25% of firms from our original sample. 
Interest rate risk is our final measure of market-based risk and the results are re-
ported in Table 6.4. An important issue to identify is our estimates for interest rate risk. 
The minimum value for this coefficient is negative. From equation (1) we see that the 
return on a security is a function of the market return and the yield on a 3 month treasury-
bill. Economically, when the yield on a treasury-bill increases (interest rates increase), 
holding everything else constant, the return on the security will decrease. Therefore in 
order to avoid confusion when interpreting the results for interest rate risk, we multiplied 
all of the βI coefficients by negative one prior to running the model.14
 
 In this form, we 
can say that an increase in our coefficient represents an increase in interest rate risk. 
= = = = = Insert Table 7.4 Here = = = = = 
 
Overall noninterest income has a very small impact on interest rate risk. We ob-
serve a marginal positive relationship with insurance, and a negative relationship with 
trading income. A possible explanation for the positive relationship between insurance 
income and interest rate risk stems from the fact that insurance premiums are relatively 
sticky. When a customer enters an insurance contract, typically they commit to a long 
term contract composed of fixed payments. During the course of the contract, even if 
market interest rates fluctuate, the premiums paid for insurance coverage do not change. 
This exposes banks to increases in interest rates since they will not be compensated for 
this cost through their existing insurance contracts. Going forward banks can factor in 
changes to interest rates into new contracts, however previously negotiated premiums 
will not change. This result is consistent with Allen and Jagtiani (2000) who also find that 
insurance income decreases interest rate risk. The negative sign for trading income sup-
ports the idea that banks use derivative instruments to hedge risk. Interest rate risk is one 
of the primary forms of risk a bank can face. Banks actively manage their liabilities and 
assets in order to minimize not only interest rate risk, but their maturity gap as well. 
                                                 
14 Allen and Jagtiani (2000) performed similar tests for interest rate risk and bank diversification. Although 
the authors did not adjust their coefficients as we did, the interpretations remain the same. 
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When banks are unable to naturally hedge their interest rate risk, it is common for banks 
to enter swap agreements in order to match fixed and variable payments. The negative 
sign for asset size suggests that larger banks are less exposed to interest rate risk. It could 
be argued that larger banks are more geographically diversified, exposing them to differ-
ent rates all over the country. Loans and mortgages in different parts of the country will 
be subject to different rates and economic conditions. 
6.3 Results – Operational efficiency 
 Table 7.1 displays the regression results for operational risk, defined as total em-
ployees’ salaries and benefits to number of full-time employees. First, we see a positive 
relationship between noninterest income and operational risk. Contrary to our hypothesis, 
as banks derive more income from noninterest activities salary per employee increases. 
Theoretically, noninterest income is considered a fee-based activity with low switching 
costs that requires substantially fewer labour inputs. This idea is particularly relevant for 
traditional noninterest activities like service charges and other noninterest income. How-
ever for securities and trading activities we know labour costs can be very high. For our 
sample we only include financial institutions in the 75th percentile in asset size or higher 
which are the primary drivers of securities and trading activities (From Table 5 we see 
the correlation between noninterest income non_ii and securities activities i_banking is 
0.91). When we remove income from trading and securities activities from total noninter-
est income in column 1, the sign becomes negative and significant. Insurance income, 
consistent with arguments for scale and scope economies, is the only non-traditional non-
interest income component that reduces operational risk. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 8.1 Here = = = = = 
 
 Results for income to employee salary, our second measure of operational effi-
ciency, are reported in Table 7.2. Overall noninterest income has a positive relationship 
with profit per employee salary. Noninterest activities appear to generate proportionately 
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more net income than employee salaries. However, none of the six noninterest income 
components included in the regression can explain this result.15
 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 8.2 Here = = = = = 
 
 Table 7.3 contains the results for our final measure of operational efficiency, non-
interest expenses to noninterest revenues. This measure indicates how each component of 
noninterest income contributes to the bank’s operating margin. From the results we see 
that almost every component of noninterest income improves efficiency. For every dollar 
of expense banks incur for a given noninterest activity the bank earns a proportionately 
higher amount of revenues. The coefficient for i_banking is negative and significant in 
column 3, however loses significance in column 4 in the stacked regression. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 8.3 Here = = = = = 
 
 Overall noninterest income improves the efficiency of the banks. Although trad-
ing and securities activities increase the amount of salaries paid to employees, this does 
not have a negative impact on banks’ net income. In addition, virtually all noninterest in-
come components appear to increase noninterest revenues with respect to noninterest ex-
penses. Important to note is that our definition of efficiency is fairly limited. The vari-
ables we use to evaluate operating efficiency are in response to the extent literature on 
scale and scope economies with respect to combining insurance, securities, and banking 
activities. Previous research suggests that existing networks and information availability 
can lead to efficiencies across financial service lines. While we recognize there are likely 
other measurements available, our results suggest operating efficiencies are realized. 
6.4 Results – Intermediation efficiency 
 Results for intermediation efficiency are found in tables 8.1 through 8.4. First, the 
results for net interest margin suggest that banks earning more income from noninterest 
                                                 
15 For robustness, we include the other six noninterest income components BHCs report in the FR Y-9C 
forms. We find net gains (losses) on sales of other real estate owned is positively related to in-
come_empsalary, and the coefficient for fiduciary income is negative and significant. 
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activities have higher profit margins. As banks diversify into other activities, they be-
come less reliant on interest income. Intuitively, banks can choose to not issue riskier 
loans because of their lower dependence on customer deposits. This could result in banks 
increasing the margin on their loans. In addition to insurance, securitization and other 
noninterest income have a positive and significant relationship with NIM. The debt to 
equity ratio is negative and statistically significant although it is not economically signifi-
cant, and larger banks are associated with increased net interest margins. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 9.1 Here = = = = = 
= = = = = Insert Table 9.2 Here = = = = = 
 
 Table 8.2 reports the results for a bank’s return on loan with respect to noninterest 
activities. Total noninterest income is positively related to return on loan. This result is 
driven primarily by securities activities and securitization, which are both significant at 
1%. The positive relationship between i_banking and return on loan is consistent with 
findings from Puri (1999), and Cole (1998). Both authors suggest informational advan-
tages gained from a security firm’s collection of private company information can be 
used for more efficient pricing of products. In addition, similar to our conclusions regard-
ing net interest margin, diversification into other activities allows banks to pick and 
choose which customers to lend to.The negative sign with respect to trading income sug-
gests that this activity reduces the banks’ return on loan. As mentioned earlier, trading 
activities are often used for hedging purposes and banks may be using derivative products 
to decrease risk. In addition to swap agreements, banks can use credit derivatives to pro-
tect themselves from default risk. This allows banks to issue riskier credit, which could 
reduce the return on loans. The positive coefficient on securitization suggests that banks 
are packaging risky loans and redistributing the risk to willing buyers. 
 The regressions for credit risk are reported in Table 8.3. Overall there is a nega-
tive relationship between credit risk and noninterest income. The coefficient on insurance 
is insignificant however i_banking and service charges are both negatively related to 
credit risk. This could suggest that banks obtain more information from customers (com-
mercial or retail) involved in multiple lines of business, are able to identify the most cred-
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itworthy clients, and consequently can more accurately price credit products. This is con-
sistent with arguments from Puri (1999) and Cole (1998) that emphasize the importance 
of information collection and cost. Intuitively, as banks focus more on noninterest income 
and less on intermediation activities, the bank is not as dependent on loans. Once again 
this will result in fewer risky loans being issued. The negative sign on trading income is 
consistent with previous results, and our hypotheses regarding hedging activities. The 
debt to equity ratio is statistically but not economically significant and the results for 
bank size indicate that larger banks have more credit risk. Larger banks are likely more 
diversified within their loan portfolio and across different business segments, which al-
lows them to be less risk averse. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 9.3 Here = = = = = 
 
 The results for loan loss reserve ratio reported in Table 8.4 reflect in some ways 
the results of the previous three tables. If the banks’ loan portfolios are achieving higher 
margins, higher returns, and fewer defaults, the amount of money set aside for loan losses 
should be reduced. Although the LLRR is considered a forward looking measure, we 
would expect that past loan productivity should be somewhat reflected in this result. We 
find that insurance, securities, trading, and service charges are all negatively related with 
LLRR. This finding is generally consistent with our findings from the previous three re-
gressions. The one exception is the result for trading income with respect to return on 
loans, however despite the fact that trading income appears to reduce returns we suspect 
this is due to hedging activities used to decrease credit risk. Securitization and other non-
interest income are positively related to LLRR. Although securitization increases both 
NIM and return on loan, it also increases credit risk which is expected to be more heavily 
weighted in calculating provisions for loan losses. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 9.4 Here = = = = = 
 
 Overall these results strongly suggest that noninterest income improves the effi-
ciency of intermediation activities. Insurance, securities activities, service charges, and 
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trading activities either increase the return of the banks’ loan portfolios, or reduce the 
credit risk. These results are consistent with theories on pricing credit and information 
gathering proposed by Puri (1999) and Cole (1998). As larger banks move towards uni-
versal banking and customers are capable of dealing with one institution for all of their 
financial needs, banks are able to acquire more information about their customers. Insur-
ance products, securities activities, and deposit accounts provide banks with information 
they can use to more accurately price credit. Conversely not all noninterest income com-
ponents enhance a bank’s ability to lend. Although securitization increases profitability of 
the loan portfolio it also increases credit risk. The ability to package and redistribute 
credit risk to other parties may provide incentives for banks to take on riskier loans. 
However, the increase in credit risk can be offset by trading activities used for hedging. 
6.5 Results – Liquidity and capital adequacy 
 Our measure for liquidity risk tests the extent to which banks’ assets are funded 
by customer deposits. It is a proxy for traditional intermediation activities and measures 
the quantity of a bank’s funds that are subject to withdrawal at any given time. The re-
sults for liquidity risk are reported in Table 9.1. Total noninterest income is negatively 
related to liquidity risk. Increases in fee income reduce the banks’ overall dependence on 
customer deposits. The specific components of noninterest income that appear to be driv-
ing this result are insurance, securities activities, and trading. All three coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with our 
hypothesis, and our expectations regarding the mechanics of these components. Partici-
pating in any of the aforementioned activities does not directly create a deposit on the 
liability side of the balance sheet however any of the three activities can potentially in-
crease the amount of assets on the balance sheet. Both scenarios result in a decrease in 
liquidity risk. Not surprisingly service charges, which are directly related to customer de-
posits, are positive and statistically significant. We also note that larger banks appear to 
have less liquidity risk which is consistent with previous studies that find larger banks are 
more focused on noninterest activities. 
 
= = = = = Insert Table 10.1 Here = = = = = 
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= = = = = Insert Table 10.2 Here = = = = = 
 
 The results for CoreCapital, measured as equity capital to total assets, are pro-
vided in Table 9.2. From a regulator’s perspective, equity capital is one of the most im-
portant indicators of a bank’s safety. Theoretically for the banking industry, equity capital 
represents the banks’ ability to withstand unforeseen losses or shocks. Our results show 
that overall total noninterest income is positively related to equity capital. Noninterest 
income appears to increase the need to carry larger amounts of equity capital on the bal-
ance sheet. This suggests that banks or regulators, or both, recognize the risk of noninter-
est income and are making appropriate adjustments. Securities activities and securitiza-
tion in particular are positively related to CoreCapital. Given that investment banking 
practices are associated with large amounts of market risk, intuitively we should expect 
these activities to increase the need for additional reserves of capital. Conversely insur-
ance represents steady and consistent income streams, which is why we observe a nega-
tive relationship with equity capital. The coefficient on our size variable indicates that 
larger institutions carry proportionately less equity capital, suggesting perhaps that 
smaller banks are less diversified and therefore more exposed to unexpected shocks. 
6.6 Robustness tests 
 For robustness we examine how noninterest income components affect our results 
during the crisis period from 2007 to 2009. We use dummy variables, as interactions 
terms for our main independent variables (noninterest income, insurance income, and se-
curities activities), that take the value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise.16
                                                 
16 Tables 11.1 to 14.2 show results for robustness tests examining the crisis period. 
 
We observe negative and significant coefficients on the crisis coefficients for noninterest 
income and securities activities for firm specific risk, market risk, and total risk. Overall, 
for our market-based risk measures (Tables 11.1 to 11.4), this suggests that noninterest 
income and securities activities may decrease risk during the crisis period. The opera-
tional efficiency results remain the same after including the crisis dummies with the ex-
ception of income to employee salary (Table 12.2). The coefficient for i_bankingcrisis 
and non_iicrisis are positive and significant at 1% suggesting that during the crisis period, 
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firms that engage more heavily in those activities generate more income relative to em-
ployee salaries. This is also consistent with our results for market-based risk. Security 
activities appear to be immune to market crashes. One possibility is that banks are cutting 
employee bonuses, staff, or both during periods of low activity. For intermediation effi-
ciency, the crisis interaction terms are negative and significant for return on loan (Table 
13.2), however the same coefficients are also negative and significant for credit risk (Ta-
ble 13.3). This suggests that during the crisis, noninterest activities reduce returns for 
loans but also decrease the likelihood of default. The results for capital adequacy and li-
quidity remain the same after including the crisis dummies (Tables 14.1 and 14.2). 
 We also want to ensure our results are robust to different data frequencies. For 
equation (1) we recalculate our risk measures using weekly instead of daily data and re-
run our models. Our results did not change (Tables 15.1 to 15.4). For the market-based 
data we also recognize that idiosyncratic and total risk have a lower bound of zero. In ad-
dition, the summary statistics suggest our distributions are skewed and have excess kurto-
sis. After removing outliers our results remain the same (Tables 16.1 to 16.4). Finally, for 
the market-based risk measures we attempt to address potential endogeneity issues by 
lagging the independent variables by one period. Although the significance on insurance 
is lost in the idiosyncratic regression (Table 17.1), and trading is no longer statistically 
significant in the interest rate risk regression (Table 17.4), overall our results are robust. 
We also perform robustness tests to control for other bank characteristics not con-
sidered in equations 2 – 5. The number of dependent variables we examine in this study 
limits our choice of control variables. Several of the intermediation efficiency variables 
we examine are commonly used in financial institutions studies to control for bank char-
acteristics. Credit risk, net interest margin, equity capital, and provisions for loan losses 
can be used as proxies for loan quality, profitability, and liquidity. Given the number of 
regressions in this study, we did not want to complicate our models by switching control 
variables in and out based on our dependent variables. In addition, we found that several 
of the control variables under consideration were highly correlated with our noninterest 
income components. For example, most banking studies would include equity capital as a 
control variable for capital adequacy and capital structure. However our measurement for 
equity capital, CoreCapital, is highly correlated with i_banking, one of our main test vari-
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ables. Intuitively, this makes sense because as banks move away from traditional inter-
mediation activities and carry fewer customer deposits on the liabilities side of the bal-
ance sheet, the equity portion will increase. Moreover, regulators require banks to be well 
capitalized when diversifying into riskier business lines like securities activities and trad-
ing. Another example would be off-balance sheet activity. In recent years this topic has 
received a growing amount of attention in the literature, and considering that banks can 
carry positions in derivative instruments equal to the level of total assets listed on their 
balance sheets, it would be logical to incorporate this activity into the model. In the FR 
Y-9C reporting forms we have access to information on all the derivative activities a 
bank engages in, however trading income already controls for this. Further potential 
missing variables biases were tested by controlling for net interest income (the other half 
of banks’ operating income), commercial and industrial loans, and consumer loans. How-
ever, including these variables did not significantly change our results.  
The following tests are motivated from our sample construction. As discussed in 
Section 4, size is a key factor in the study of noninterest income, and we attempt to con-
struct our sample in order to best capture the effects of non-traditional noninterest income 
on bank performance. In our original sample we include only the top 25% of banks. To 
verify our results we perform the same tests using the top 30% and top 20% of banks. 
There are some minor changes in the significance levels of some variables but overall our 
results hold. However when we include the entire sample in our regressions we find some 
interesting results.17
                                                 
17 For our full market-based sample we have a total of 2862 observations, while for the accounting based-
sample there are 7276 observations. 
 For the market based risk measures many of the noninterest income 
components become negative and significant for idiosyncratic and total risk. Security ac-
tivities in particular changes from insignificant to negative with a p-value of 0.0165. We 
know that smaller banks tend to derive less of their operating income from noninterest 
activities, which is consistent with our suspicion that for some noninterest income activi-
ties, diversification benefits are primarily realized with smaller weights. Another interest-
ing result come from the regression for interest rate risk, where the coefficient on trading 
income switches from negative and significant to positive and significant. Previously, the 
negative coefficient suggested larger banks are using trading activities to hedge their in-
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terest rate risk. However when smaller banks are included in the sample trading income 
appears to have the opposite effect. Larger banks are the market makers for derivatives 
and employ highly skilled labour to trade swaps, options, and forwards. It may be the 
case that smaller banks lack the size, scope, and expertise to effectively trade in the de-
rivatives market. The nature of trading activities between large and small banks may be 
fundamentally different. In fact, when we observe summary statistics for small banks we 
see that mean and median values for positions in credit default swaps, interest rate deriva-
tives, and other trading contracts are not significantly different from zero. 
 For the accounting-based data we observe some differences when including the 
full sample as well. Insurance income appears to lose some of its efficiency with respect 
to operational risk. It appears as though smaller banks are not able to capture, to the same 
degree, scale and scope economies from combining traditional lending activities and in-
surance. In addition, insurance, trading, and securities activities show no significance 
with respect to the banks’ intermediation efficiency. The larger banks appear to be bene-
fiting from the size of their networks, the scale and scope of their activities, and the 
highly skilled labour employed to effectively manage their risk. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study investigates the relationship between noninterest income and bank per-
formance in the post Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act period. Deregulation in 1999 allowed 
bank holding companies to operate securities and insurance affiliates, representing a ma-
jor shift in the US financial services industry. Results from our sample, which includes 
large BHCs from the FR Y-9C reporting forms, provide evidence that diversification 
benefits extend beyond income smoothing and reduced risk. 
 Using FR Y-9C reporting forms collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago, we obtain bank holding company data from 2001 to 2009. Daily stock return data is 
retrieved from the CRSP database and interest rates are collected from the Federal Re-
serve Bank of St. Louis. In this study we examine what impact noninterest income com-
ponents have on market-based risk measures, and we extend the literature by evaluating 
how fee income affects the operational efficiency of banks and traditional intermediation 
activities. 
 Insurance income reduces firm specific and total risk for banks. The other nonin-
terest components present insignificant results, which may suggest is evidence that the 
majority of large banks have already reached the optimal level of those activities to re-
duce risk. Noninterest income as a whole and securities activities increase the level of 
systematic risk for banks. This result is consistent with other studies that argue invest-
ment banking practices are sensitive to fluctuations in the market. Finally, results show 
that insurance activities are exposed to interest rate risk. It can be argued that the long-
term and fixed nature of insurance contracts exposes this income stream to changes in 
interest rates. 
 For operational efficiency we find some evidence supporting the existence of 
economies of scale and scope for insurance activities. Banks that earn more insurance 
income are associated with a lower ratio of salaries per employee. Once a BHC has al-
ready established a network of clients, personal bankers can distribute additional products 
at almost no extra cost. Contrary to this result, total noninterest income increases em-
ployee compensation. This result is largely driven by securities and trading activities, fi-
nancial services that are well known for the significant salaries and bonuses distributed to 
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their employees. In addition, while personal bankers can distribute banking and insurance 
products, we know that securities and trading activities require a more highly skilled la-
bour force that is for the most part separate from retail banking. However, despite the 
higher salaries noninterest income produces a proportionately higher amount of income, 
and decreases the ratio of expenses to revenues. 
 Overall, noninterest income improves intermediation efficiency. Banks that diver-
sify into noninterest income increase the margin on traditional lending activities, achieve 
higher returns on their loan portfolios, and reduce credit risk. BHCs that offer a wider 
range of services could be benefiting from having access to all of their clients’ informa-
tion. This allows BHCs to more easily identify customer needs, and more accurately price 
credit products. In addition, trading and securitization activities allow banks to diversify 
and hedge their lending activities. Shifting more focus to noninterest activities does pro-
vide the bank with more liquidity given that they are less reliant on customer deposits, 
however more volatile activities like securities have to be hedged with higher proportions 
of equity capital. 
 For robustness, we examine the effects of noninterest income during the crisis pe-
riod and find that the diversification benefits of noninterest income appear to be more 
prevalent during the market crisis. Our results are robust with respect to different data 
frequencies, the removal of outliers, and endogeneity between the independent and de-
pendent variables. Given the importance of size when studying noninterest income, we 
adjust our sample to include the largest 20% and 30% of banks. We also incorporate sev-
eral additional variables to control for other bank characteristics. Overall we find similar 
results. When the entire sample of banks is included in the regressions, diversification 
benefits appear to be more prevalent. Smaller banks produce proportionately smaller 
amounts of noninterest income. Consistent with portfolio theory, the risk reducing bene-
fits of noninterest income decrease gradually as higher weights of the same income 
stream are added to the portfolio. Finally, the operational and intermediation efficiencies 
of noninterest income are reduced when small banks are introduced to the sample. Con-
sistent with theories on economies of scope and scale, it appears as though bank size is 
important when analyzing noninterest income. 
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 These results provide new evidence for the debate on noninterest income. Previ-
ous research has focused on the volatility and correlation of noninterest income streams 
with traditional intermediation activities. While trading, securitization, and securities ac-
tivities can be more risky than traditional banking, we argue that the diversification into 
noninterest income is motivated by other factors than decreasing the volatility of cash 
flows. First, there are many synergies created by combining similar activities. Larger 
banks with significant networks can benefit from economies of scope and scale by broad-
ening into other services. Secondly, expanding the number of services a bank offers en-
ables customers to execute all of their financial needs in one location. BHCs then accu-
mulate more information through a variety of activities, which enhances traditional in-
termediation activities. 
 There are limitations to our study. First, we do not differentiate between BHCs 
that were active in securities and insurance activities prior to the GLBA. Secondly, we do 
not distinguish between firms that have acquired subsidiaries and those that have grown 
noninterest components organically, nor do we identify the year when firms began oper-
ating a securities or insurance affiliate. Our study is primarily concerned with the combi-
nation of banking, securities, and insurance activities in the post-GLBA era. Whether fi-
nancial institutions develop non-bank services internally through growth or externally 
through acquisition is beyond the scope of this study. Finally, our approach to noninterest 
income is very broad. We attempt to evaluate the effect of noninterest income in several 
different areas of a bank’s operations. A much higher degree of focus and attention could 
be given to each topic, something that we hope will encourage future research. 
 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act represented a major shift in US banking practices 
and is a key motivation for this study. Although the aim of this paper is not to directly 
address the causes of the financial crisis that began in 2007, our results provide some evi-
dence in favour of deregulation. However in July of 2010, the US government signed into 
law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The primary aim 
of the new act is to protect consumers and the public at large by ending “too big to fail” 
financial institutions and avoiding government bailouts. The Dodd-Frank Act proposes 
stricter requirements for capital, leverage, liquidity, and other ratios that discourage banks 
from growing large enough to pose a significant threat to the economy. Counter to our 
  
39 
 
results, this could force large financial conglomerates to break apart and focus on core 
business lines. As our results suggest, combining financial services can result in more 
diverse cash flows, reduced volatility, economies of scope and scale, and improvements 
in traditional intermediation activities. Despite these improvements, overwhelming public 
pressure may have influenced decision makers. Although it is clear that banks do require 
some regulation, especially with respect to transparency, accountability, and complexity 
of financial instruments, our results suggest that diversification of financial services, 
when managed responsibly, can enhance banks’ traditional intermediation activities 
through larger returns and lower credit risk. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLES 
 
Table 1: Bank Operating Revenue Components 
This table decomposes bank operating revenue and reports each component’s weight, volatility, and correlation with net inter-
est income. These figures are based on our accounting-based performance data in Table 3 that includes the top 25% of banks 
according to asset size in any given year. In the first column (% of Operating Income), we sum the aggregate value of each in-
come component across all bank holding companies in our sample period (2001 – 2009), and divide by total operating income 
(Net interest income + noninterest income). The volatility and correlation measures are based on definitions from our method-
ology section where all variables are scaled by total assets. 
  
% of Operating In-
come   Volatility   
Correlation with Net 
Interest Income 
  
   
   
 
 Net Interest Income 
 
51.59% 
  
9.55E-03 
 
1.00  
 Noninterest Income 
 
48.41% 
  
3.86E-02 
 
-0.09  
 Insurance 
 
6.50% 
  
5.04E-03 
 
0.07  
 Investment Banking 
 
8.51% 
  
3.45E-02 
 
-0.15  
 Trading 
 
2.56% 
  
2.10E-03 
 
-0.14  
 Service Charges 
 
5.71% 
  
4.38E-03 
 
0.16  
 Securitization 
 
3.11% 
  
5.55E-03 
 
0.10  
 Other Noninterest Income 
 
11.83% 
  
8.06E-03 
 
0.18  
 Fiduciary 
 
4.81% 
  
5.92E-03 
 
-0.24  
 Loans and Leases 
 
1.00% 
  
3.62E-03 
 
0.07  
 Other Assets 
 
0.83% 
  
8.43E-04 
 
-0.04  
 Real Estate 
 
-0.09% 
  
5.84E-04 
 
0.01  
 Servicing Fees 
 
3.32% 
  
2.67E-03 
 
0.11  
 Venture 
 
0.32% 
  
4.55E-04 
 
-0.04  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Market-Based Risk Data 
This table contains summary statistics for the variables included in the market-based risk regressions. The sample includes the 
largest 25% of BHCs from our original set spanning from 2001 to 2009.  
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Dependent - Market 
       
         Idiosyncratic 712 0.0059 0.1001 0.0186 0.0137 0.0137 2.3223 6.2456 
Beta 712 0.0924 3.1363 1.2232 1.1503 0.5081 0.8241 0.6159 
StdDev 712 0.0065 0.1038 0.0235 0.0171 0.0177 1.9793 3.7433 
IRRisk 712 -8.0184 10.6161 0.1903 0.0094 1.2304 2.5332 27.4255 
         Control and Independent 
       
         D_E 712 0.2655 28.5631 10.2193 9.9735 2.9851 0.5376 3.6701 
Assets 712 5.94E+09 2.23E+12 1.06E+11 1.67E+10 2.95E+11 4.812404 24.81972 
ln_Asset 712 22.5058 28.4306 24.0261 23.5388 1.3612 1.2312 0.9782 
Non_II 712 -0.0021 0.6722 0.0274 0.0175 0.0552 8.1791 75.2000 
Insurance 712 0.0000 0.0777 0.0019 0.0004 0.0077 8.0568 67.5419 
I_Banking 712 0.0000 0.6514 0.0079 0.0009 0.0521 9.5759 94.9712 
Service_Charge 712 0.0000 0.0235 0.0040 0.0037 0.0030 1.9618 8.8558 
Trading 712 -0.0189 0.0255 0.0007 0.0000 0.0024 2.2926 34.3539 
Securitization 712 -0.0005 0.1013 0.0012 0.0000 0.0079 9.1755 92.3549 
Other_NonII 712 -0.0070 0.0627 0.0061 0.0042 0.0072 4.2644 23.6033 
OtherAsset 712 -0.0020 0.0205 0.0002 0.0000 0.0010 13.8441 261.0593 
RealEst 712 -0.0098 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 -11.1193 160.6487 
Loans_Leases 712 -0.0050 0.0395 0.0010 0.0003 0.0032 7.5170 70.8104 
Service_Fee 712 -0.0231 0.0289 0.0007 0.0001 0.0030 4.9286 49.9430 
Venture 712 -0.0104 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 -6.2677 102.2692 
Fiduciary 712 0.0000 0.0544 0.0037 0.0014 0.0073 3.2970 11.2131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
45 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Accounting-Based Performance Data 
This table contains summary statistics for the variables included in the accounting-based risk regressions. The sample includes 
the largest 25% of BHCs from our original set spanning from 2001 to 2009. 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Dependent - Accounting 
       
         CoreCapital 1828 0.0000 0.7853 0.0947 0.0889 0.0536 7.7243 85.4964 
LLRR 1828 -0.0041 0.1046 0.0060 0.0025 0.0098 3.7329 19.9948 
NonIE_NonIR 1828 -78.8738 115.2405 2.7999 2.1204 4.8492 7.5889 238.4396 
NIM 1828 -0.0075 0.4605 0.0395 0.0374 0.0211 10.6809 172.8594 
Return_loan 1828 0.0024 0.5571 0.0679 0.0648 0.0249 8.0838 125.6657 
Income_EmpSalary 1828 -19.2828 164.4000 0.6167 0.6365 4.0588 35.9976 1454.2910 
Liquidity_Risk 1828 0.0000 0.6169 0.1619 0.1556 0.1055 0.5940 0.3406 
Credit_Risk 1828 0.0000 0.6659 0.0188 0.0095 0.0337 8.3608 116.5987 
Operational_Risk 1828 0.0013 0.8542 0.0705 0.0627 0.0408 7.3820 98.1828 
         Control and Independent 
       
         D_E 1828 0.2655 3112649 4840 10.2014 119430 24.8282 617.9018 
Assets 1828 2.18E+09 2.23E+12 6.22E+10 7.99E+09 2.07E+11 6.4125 48.1455 
ln_Asset 1828 21.5007 28.4306 23.2370 22.8010 1.4817 1.2076 0.9152 
Non_II 1828 -0.0070 0.6722 0.0199 0.0129 0.0386 10.6697 138.8246 
Insurance 1828 0.0000 0.0777 0.0011 0.0002 0.0050 11.7511 151.5250 
I_Banking 1828 0.0000 0.6514 0.0042 0.0006 0.0345 14.0626 209.6193 
Service_Charge 1828 0.0000 0.0878 0.0039 0.0034 0.0044 9.3416 148.3435 
Trading 1828 -0.0189 0.0274 0.0005 0.0000 0.0021 3.4345 52.9142 
Securitization 1828 -0.0049 0.1013 0.0007 0.0000 0.0056 11.7918 161.3926 
Other_NonII 1828 -0.0070 0.1481 0.0055 0.0035 0.0081 7.4417 87.2548 
OtherAsset 1828 -0.0023 0.0205 0.0002 0.0000 0.0008 12.6509 239.2212 
RealEst 1828 -0.0099 0.0060 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 -6.9221 111.2469 
Loans_Leases 1828 -0.0076 0.0734 0.0010 0.0003 0.0036 9.9290 137.7091 
Service_Fee 1828 -0.0246 0.0384 0.0006 0.0001 0.0027 5.9931 77.4329 
Venture 1828 -0.0104 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 -6.6744 193.9195 
Fiduciary 1828 0.0000 0.0632 0.0024 0.0009 0.0059 5.4570 35.4398 
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Table 4: Number of Banks by Year in Market and Accounting Samples 
 
Year Market Accounting 
2001 77 163 
2002 82 175 
2003 84 186 
2004 85 196 
2005 86 232 
2006 83 214 
2007 75 215 
2008 71 219 
2009 69 228 
Total 712 1828 
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Table 5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for Market-Based Sample 
This table contains the pair wise correlation coefficients for all test variables for the 25% largest BHCs from our market-based 
sample. 
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D_E 1 
              Ln_Asset 0.09 1 
             Fiduciary 0.02 0.05 1 
            I_Banking -0.35 -0.06 0.21 1 
           Insurance 0.19 0.22 -0.10 -0.03 1 
          Loans_Leases -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 1 
         Non_II -0.34 0.03 0.30 0.95 0.08 0.00 1 
        Other_NonII -0.05 0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.12 1 
       OtherAsset 0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 1 
      RealEst 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.03 1 
     Securitization -0.18 0.12 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.21 -0.05 0.02 1 
    Service_Charge 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.08 -0.12 0.15 0.02 0.00 -0.17 1 
   Service_Fee -0.16 0.20 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.20 0.19 0.07 -0.02 0.70 -0.09 1 
  Trading 0.06 0.15 0.29 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.20 -0.02 0.03 0.10 1 
 Venture -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.05 -0.10 0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.04 1 
N 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 
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Table 6: Pearson Correlation Matrix for Accounting-Based Sample 
This table contains the pair wise correlation coefficients for all test variables for the 25% largest BHCs from our accounting-
based sample. 
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D_E 1 
              Ln_Asset -0.01 1 
             Fiduciary -0.02 0.13 1 
            I_Banking 0.00 0.01 0.18 1 
           Insurance 0.00 0.20 -0.05 -0.01 1 
          Loans_Leases -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 1 
         Non_II -0.01 0.13 0.30 0.91 0.11 0.06 1 
        Other_NonII -0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.27 1 
       OtherAsset 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 1 
      RealEst -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.03 1 
     Securitization 0.00 0.15 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.22 0.23 -0.04 0.02 1 
    Service_Charge -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.00 -0.09 1 
   Service_Fee 0.00 0.17 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.18 0.05 -0.03 0.59 -0.05 1 
  Trading 0.03 0.19 0.18 0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.14 0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.07 1 
 Venture 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.05 1 
N 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 
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Table 7.1: Market-Based Risk – Idiosyncratic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of firm specific risk (idiosyncratic) on measures of noninterest income. 
Idiosyncratic risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit by calculating the volatility of 
the error term (eit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests 
several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income 
(trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009. 
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Table 7.1: Market-Based Risk – Idiosyncratic Risk 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Idiosyncratic 
          
non_ii 0.0018 
   
 
(0.289) 
   insurance 
 
-0.0411* 
 
-0.0762*** 
  
(-1.934) 
 
(-3.250) 
i_banking 
  
0.0019 -0.0004 
   
(0.277) (-0.051) 
service_charge 
   
-0.4869*** 
    
(-5.769) 
trading 
   
-0.0863 
    
(-0.638) 
securitization 
   
0.1022*** 
    
(4.050) 
other_nonii 
   
-0.0075 
    
(-0.211) 
d_e 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
 
(3.584) (3.815) (3.540) (3.971) 
ln_asset -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(-0.883) (-0.639) (-0.872) (-0.915) 
year_2002 -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0013** 
 
(-1.935) (-1.902) (-1.934) (-1.971) 
year_2003 -0.0057*** -0.0057*** -0.0057*** -0.0056*** 
 
(-8.426) (-8.343) (-8.411) (-8.518) 
year_2004 -0.0062*** -0.0062*** -0.0062*** -0.0064*** 
 
(-9.710) (-9.620) (-9.707) (-10.091) 
year_2005 -0.0057*** -0.0057*** -0.0057*** -0.0060*** 
 
(-7.430) (-7.394) (-7.441) (-8.181) 
year_2006 -0.0061*** -0.0061*** -0.0061*** -0.0063*** 
 
(-8.614) (-8.605) (-8.654) (-9.201) 
year_2007 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0011 
 
(-1.011) (-1.035) (-1.030) (-1.204) 
year_2008 0.0240*** 0.0240*** 0.0240*** 0.0238*** 
 
(12.995) (13.072) (13.040) (13.020) 
year_2009 0.0244*** 0.0244*** 0.0244*** 0.0244*** 
 
(11.389) (11.453) (11.405) (11.509) 
Constant 0.0149*** 0.0137*** 0.0148*** 0.0166*** 
 
(3.232) (2.840) (3.211) (3.354) 
     Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.677 0.678 0.677 0.694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.672 0.672 0.672 0.687 
F-Statistic 133.420 133.690 133.420 98.630 
Prob (F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7.2: Market-Based Risk – Systematic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of market risk (Beta) on measures of noninterest income. Systematic 
risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient for daily market returns 
(βM). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), in-
surance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests several com-
ponents of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), ser-
vice charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). 
All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank charac-
teristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year 
dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009. 
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Table 7.2: Market-Based Risk – Systematic Risk 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Beta 
          
non_ii 1.0896*** 
   
 
(4.305) 
   insurance 
 
-0.9775 
 
-2.6074** 
  
(-0.812) 
 
(-2.175) 
i_banking 
  
1.0330*** 0.9066*** 
   
(3.888) (3.575) 
service_charge 
   
-21.6047*** 
    
(-4.432) 
trading 
   
8.4514 
    
(1.270) 
securitization 
   
6.1006** 
    
(2.394) 
other_nonii 
   
-2.0414 
    
(-1.093) 
d_e 0.0181*** 0.0112** 0.0172*** 0.0203*** 
 
(3.405) (1.980) (3.044) (3.813) 
ln_asset 0.0120 0.0159 0.0159 0.0109 
 
(1.064) (1.350) (1.406) (0.929) 
year_2002 0.5034*** 0.5057*** 0.5030*** 0.5066*** 
 
(8.657) (8.427) (8.533) (8.996) 
year_2003 0.3836*** 0.3860*** 0.3837*** 0.3886*** 
 
(7.288) (7.134) (7.187) (7.616) 
year_2004 0.1217** 0.1196** 0.1204** 0.1182*** 
 
(2.580) (2.484) (2.529) (2.616) 
year_2005 0.3770*** 0.3743*** 0.3743*** 0.3669*** 
 
(6.591) (6.480) (6.541) (6.411) 
year_2006 0.1961*** 0.1897*** 0.1911*** 0.1855*** 
 
(3.564) (3.349) (3.449) (3.475) 
year_2007 0.7064*** 0.6980*** 0.6984*** 0.7004*** 
 
(13.197) (12.754) (12.956) (13.276) 
year_2008 0.8947*** 0.8820*** 0.8849*** 0.8881*** 
 
(14.860) (14.463) (14.646) (14.953) 
year_2009 1.1712*** 1.1560*** 1.1633*** 1.1648*** 
 
(16.211) (16.002) (16.107) (15.946) 
Constant 0.2553 0.2684 0.1974 0.3772 
 
(0.947) (0.944) (0.731) (1.328) 
     Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.464 0.452 0.461 0.480 
Adjusted R-squared 0.455 0.443 0.453 0.480 
F-Statistic 55.038 52.433 54.507 42.040 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
  
53 
 
Table 7.3: Market-Based Risk – Total Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of stock price volatility (StdDev) on measures of noninterest income. 
Total risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns (Rit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests 
several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income 
(trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009. 
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Table 7.3: Market-Based Risk – Total Risk 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES StdDev 
          
non_ii 0.0081 
   
 
(1.360) 
   Insurance 
 
-0.0413** 
 
-0.0820*** 
  
(-2.052) 
 
(-3.721) 
i_banking 
  
0.0083 0.0057 
   
(1.269) (0.873) 
service_charge 
   
-0.5390*** 
    
(-5.613) 
Trading 
   
-0.0851 
    
(-0.579) 
securitization 
   
0.1169*** 
    
(4.033) 
other_nonii 
   
-0.0137 
    
(-0.333) 
d_e 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
 
(3.557) (3.477) (3.485) (4.012) 
ln_asset 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(0.508) (0.783) (0.640) (0.517) 
year_2002 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013* 
 
(1.552) (1.563) (1.538) (1.663) 
year_2003 -0.0051*** -0.0051*** -0.0051*** -0.0050*** 
 
(-6.709) (-6.604) (-6.664) (-6.797) 
year_2004 -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0068*** 
 
(-9.195) (-9.105) (-9.165) (-9.663) 
year_2005 -0.0060*** -0.0060*** -0.0060*** -0.0063*** 
 
(-7.100) (-7.072) (-7.112) (-7.791) 
year_2006 -0.0065*** -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0068*** 
 
(-8.235) (-8.230) (-8.284) (-8.858) 
year_2007 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 
 
(1.291) (1.227) (1.234) (1.129) 
year_2008 0.0349*** 0.0348*** 0.0348*** 0.0346*** 
 
(17.505) (17.492) (17.508) (17.606) 
year_2009 0.0356*** 0.0355*** 0.0355*** 0.0355*** 
 
(15.289) (15.288) (15.288) (15.403) 
Constant 0.0097* 0.0087 0.0092* 0.0113* 
 
(1.786) (1.532) (1.695) (1.940) 
     Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.778 
Adjusted R-squared 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.773 
F-Statistic 207.333 207.021 207.279 152.197 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7.4: Market-Based Risk – Interest Rate Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of interest rate risk (IRRisk) on measures of noninterest income. Inter-
est rate risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient on the daily returns 
of the equally weighted CRSP index (βI). The first three specifications test our primary independent vari-
ables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The 
fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking 
jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other 
noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all re-
gressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural loga-
rithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009. 
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Table 7.4: Market-Based Risk – Interest Rate Risk 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES IRRisk 
          
non_ii 0.4495 
   
 
(0.822) 
   insurance 
 
7.3543** 
 
5.8640* 
  
(2.427) 
 
(1.696) 
i_banking 
  
0.3498 0.3555 
   
(0.591) (0.561) 
service_charge 
   
-7.3146 
    
(-0.562) 
trading 
   
-27.2916** 
    
(-2.316) 
securitization 
   
3.9217 
    
(1.104) 
other_nonii 
   
-0.9830 
    
(-0.141) 
d_e 0.0476 0.0414 0.0467 0.0472 
 
(1.571) (1.478) (1.534) (1.428) 
ln_asset -0.6329*** -0.6337*** -0.6329*** -0.6394*** 
 
(-12.687) (-13.081) (-12.702) (-12.418) 
year_2002 -0.1543*** -0.1618*** -0.1528*** -0.1559*** 
 
(-4.098) (-4.284) (-4.130) (-4.157) 
year_2003 -0.0929 -0.0928 -0.0927 -0.0961 
 
(-1.431) (-1.417) (-1.425) (-1.445) 
year_2004 0.0436 0.0390 0.0430 0.0218 
 
(0.961) (0.856) (0.949) (0.461) 
year_2005 -0.0356 -0.0383 -0.0367 -0.0528 
 
(-0.781) (-0.846) (-0.816) (-1.103) 
year_2006 -0.0900 -0.0955 -0.0922 -0.1042 
 
(-1.438) (-1.554) (-1.501) (-1.597) 
year_2007 0.0367 0.0338 0.0333 0.0172 
 
(0.670) (0.642) (0.635) (0.306) 
year_2008 0.3387*** 0.3325*** 0.3344*** 0.3075*** 
 
(4.714) (4.891) (4.847) (4.230) 
year_2009 -1.4067*** -1.4157*** -1.4105*** -1.4028*** 
 
(-3.249) (-3.275) (-3.261) (-3.231) 
Constant 3.2116*** 3.4571*** 3.1952*** 3.3146*** 
 
(3.991) (4.115) (3.958) (4.008) 
     Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.186 0.187 0.186 0.191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.175 0.173 0.173 
F-Statistic 14.513 14.665 14.498 10.275 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 8.1: Operational Efficiency – Operational Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio total salaries and benefits to number of full-time employees 
(Operational_Risk) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary inde-
pendent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities 
(i_banking). The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance 
and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitiza-
tion), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total 
assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the 
natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not 
reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Operational_Risk 
          
non_ii 0.1067*** 
   
 
(8.087) 
   insurance 
 
-0.7041*** 
 
-0.6976*** 
  
(-5.766) 
 
(-5.754) 
i_banking 
  
0.1381*** 0.1067*** 
   
(7.859) (4.590) 
trading 
   
3.6066*** 
    
(3.166) 
service_charge 
   
-1.8355*** 
    
(-4.069) 
securitization 
   
-0.1111 
    
(-1.014) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0531 
    
(0.337) 
d_e -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(-4.375) (-4.351) (-4.341) (-4.891) 
ln_asset 0.0073*** 0.0081*** 0.0076*** 0.0066*** 
 
(7.166) (7.737) (7.583) (6.588) 
Constant -0.1162*** -0.1315*** -0.1210*** -0.0935*** 
 
(-4.877) (-5.370) (-5.147) (-4.045) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.108 0.105 0.112 0.190 
Adjusted R-squared 0.103 0.100 0.106 0.183 
F-Statistic 20.026 19.458 20.787 26.542 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 8.2: Operational Efficiency – Net Income to Employee Salary 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio net income to total salaries and benefits (In-
come_EmpSalary) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary inde-
pendent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities 
(i_banking). The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance 
and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitiza-
tion), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total 
assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the 
natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not 
reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Income_EmpSalary 
          
non_ii 2.3347*** 
   
 
(3.523) 
   insurance 
 
-1.0450 
 
-0.4965 
  
(-0.153) 
 
(-0.070) 
i_banking 
  
0.7087 0.5316 
   
(1.255) (0.725) 
trading 
   
-6.9362 
    
(-0.393) 
service_charge 
   
-29.7269 
    
(-1.037) 
securitization 
   
-16.3283 
    
(-1.020) 
other_nonii 
   
54.8893 
    
(1.563) 
d_e 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.475) (0.369) (0.381) (0.746) 
ln_asset 0.0070 0.0147 0.0138 -0.0310** 
 
(0.282) (0.512) (0.541) (-2.024) 
Constant 0.5486 0.4229 0.4394 1.2720*** 
 
(0.926) (0.626) (0.725) (3.414) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.034 
Adjusted R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.026 
F-Statistic 4.069 3.986 3.992 4.038 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 8.3: Operational Efficiency – Noninterest Expense to Noninterest Revenue 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio noninterest expense to noninterest revenue (NonIE_NonIR) 
on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; 
noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth 
regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; 
trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other nonin-
terest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions 
we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total 
assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES NonIE_NonIR 
          
non_ii -13.2181*** 
   
 
(-4.410) 
   insurance 
 
-20.3729** 
 
-37.1694*** 
  
(-2.553) 
 
(-3.008) 
i_banking 
  
-5.4856*** -4.6111 
   
(-9.766) (-1.319) 
trading 
   
-505.9672* 
    
(-1.671) 
service_charge 
   
-106.6502*** 
    
(-3.714) 
securitization 
   
-21.9203*** 
    
(-3.291) 
other_nonii 
   
-47.0527*** 
    
(-4.884) 
d_e 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.790) (0.826) (0.818) (1.179) 
ln_asset -0.3022*** -0.3286*** -0.3408*** -0.1582 
 
(-2.870) (-3.089) (-3.294) (-1.006) 
Constant 10.4241*** 10.7518*** 11.0397*** 7.9488** 
 
(4.114) (4.176) (4.367) (2.470) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.032 0.022 0.023 0.085 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027 0.016 0.017 0.077 
F-Statistic 5.523 3.703 3.892 10.551 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9.1: Intermediation Efficiency – Net Interest Margin 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio net interest income divided by held-to-maturity securities, 
available-for-sale securities, and loans and leases (NIM) on measures of noninterest income. The first three 
specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (in-
surance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests several components of noninter-
est income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (ser-
vice_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest 
income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as 
the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are 
included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES NIM 
          
non_ii 0.0328** 
   
 
(2.224) 
   insurance 
 
0.2679*** 
 
0.2563*** 
  
(2.965) 
 
(3.080) 
i_banking 
  
0.0099 0.0132 
   
(0.627) (0.837) 
trading 
   
0.0563 
    
(0.088) 
service_charge 
   
0.1305 
    
(1.602) 
securitization 
   
0.6279*** 
    
(5.054) 
other_nonii 
   
0.1509** 
    
(2.025) 
d_e -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(-4.059) (-4.097) (-4.059) (-3.971) 
ln_asset 0.0020*** 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0014** 
 
(3.000) (2.802) (3.226) (2.033) 
Constant -0.0035 -0.0011 -0.0050 0.0065 
 
(-0.226) (-0.070) (-0.332) (0.401) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.039 0.039 0.036 0.074 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.030 0.065 
F-Statistic 6.677 6.746 6.094 8.980 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9.2: Intermediation Efficiency – Return on Loan 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio interest and fee income from loans to total loans and leases 
(Return_Loan) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independ-
ent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities 
(i_banking). The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance 
and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitiza-
tion), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total 
assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the 
natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not 
reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Return_Loan 
          
non_ii 0.0942*** 
   
 
(5.018) 
   insurance 
 
0.2596 
 
0.1839 
  
(1.503) 
 
(1.342) 
i_banking 
  
0.0664*** 0.0750*** 
   
(3.820) (4.079) 
trading 
   
-1.2965*** 
    
(-3.594) 
service_charge 
   
-0.0786 
    
(-0.723) 
securitization 
   
1.4625*** 
    
(4.477) 
other_nonii 
   
0.1538* 
    
(1.777) 
d_e -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(-0.452) (-0.523) (-0.501) (-0.308) 
ln_asset 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0000 
 
(0.842) (1.130) (1.476) (-0.105) 
Constant 0.0768*** 0.0762*** 0.0725*** 0.0867*** 
 
(7.445) (7.303) (7.135) (7.723) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.147 0.128 0.134 0.264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.142 0.123 0.129 0.257 
F-Statistic 28.377 24.322 25.595 40.528 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
  
62 
 
Table 9.3: Intermediation Efficiency – Credit Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio loans past due and not accruing to total loans and leases 
(Credit_Risk) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independ-
ent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities 
(i_banking). The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance 
and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitiza-
tion), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total 
assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the 
natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not 
reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Credit_Risk 
          
non_ii -0.0334*** 
   
 
(-2.592) 
   insurance 
 
-0.0362 
 
-0.1147 
  
(-0.214) 
 
(-0.777) 
i_banking 
  
-0.0378*** -0.0382*** 
   
(-3.465) (-3.175) 
trading 
   
-0.8925*** 
    
(-2.807) 
service_charge 
   
-0.6147*** 
    
(-3.449) 
securitization 
   
0.6604* 
    
(1.752) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0182 
    
(0.094) 
d_e 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
(18.615) (18.719) (18.699) (17.168) 
ln_asset 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 
 
(4.120) (4.117) (3.919) (3.216) 
Constant -0.0218** -0.0208** -0.0203** -0.0133 
 
(-2.311) (-2.118) (-2.170) (-1.167) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.201 0.200 0.201 0.223 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.195 0.196 0.217 
F-Statistic 41.535 41.172 41.552 32.574 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9.4: Intermediation Efficiency – Loan Loss Reserve Ratio 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio provision for loan and leases loss to total assets (LLRR) on 
measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; non-
interest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth 
regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; 
trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other nonin-
terest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions 
we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total 
assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES LLRR 
          
non_ii 0.0011 
   
 
(0.179) 
   insurance 
 
-0.0516* 
 
-0.0694*** 
  
(-1.811) 
 
(-2.935) 
i_banking 
  
-0.0140*** -0.0132*** 
   
(-3.468) (-3.065) 
trading 
   
-0.2387* 
    
(-1.949) 
service_charge 
   
-0.1032** 
    
(-2.111) 
securitization 
   
0.2777*** 
    
(6.067) 
other_nonii 
   
0.1807*** 
    
(5.440) 
d_e -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000 
 
(-1.679) (-1.686) (-1.702) (-1.540) 
ln_asset 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0002** 
 
(3.810) (4.080) (3.831) (2.122) 
Constant -0.0059** -0.0067** -0.0060** -0.0018 
 
(-2.077) (-2.336) (-2.088) (-0.653) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.286 0.287 0.288 0.348 
Adjusted R-squared 0.282 0.282 0.284 0.342 
F-Statistic 66.137 66.348 66.917 60.440 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 10.1: Liquidity and Capital Adequacy – Liquidity Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio core deposits (NOW, ATS, time deposits, and other trans-
action accounts) to total assets (Liquidity_Risk) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifi-
cations test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), 
and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income 
in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), 
securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income compo-
nents are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to 
equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included 
from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Liquidity_Risk 
          
non_ii -0.3780*** 
   
 
(-10.834) 
   insurance 
 
-0.8416*** 
 
-0.8079*** 
  
(-4.939) 
 
(-4.699) 
i_banking 
  
-0.4187*** -0.3710*** 
   
(-10.618) (-8.521) 
trading 
   
-4.5551*** 
    
(-4.916) 
service_charge 
   
3.7328*** 
    
(3.042) 
securitization 
   
0.1520 
    
(0.389) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0090 
    
(0.033) 
d_e 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
(9.381) (9.119) (9.004) (13.298) 
ln_asset -0.0311*** -0.0317*** -0.0322*** -0.0295*** 
 
(-27.170) (-26.786) (-27.797) (-24.933) 
Constant 0.8972*** 0.9028*** 0.9144*** 0.8417*** 
 
(30.545) (29.887) (30.886) (27.518) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.270 0.252 0.270 0.303 
Adjusted R-squared 0.265 0.248 0.265 0.297 
F-Statistic 60.932 55.730 60.930 49.212 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 10.2: Liquidity and Capital Adequacy – Core Capital 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio total equity capital to total assets (CoreCapital) on meas-
ures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest 
income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression 
tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading in-
come (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest in-
come (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we 
control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total as-
sets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES CoreCapital 
          
non_ii 1.0699*** 
   
 
(16.020) 
   insurance 
 
-0.3143*** 
 
-0.2384*** 
  
(-3.507) 
 
(-3.019) 
i_banking 
  
1.2272*** 1.2326*** 
   
(18.366) (18.270) 
trading 
   
-0.7471 
    
(-1.509) 
service_charge 
   
-0.0882 
    
(-0.487) 
securitization 
   
1.4144*** 
    
(8.337) 
other_nonii 
   
0.2478* 
    
(1.921) 
d_e18 -0.0000***  -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(-30.694) (-22.341) (-25.069) (-18.958) 
ln_asset -0.0039*** -0.0005 -0.0010* -0.0016*** 
 
(-6.548) (-0.757) (-1.859) (-2.784) 
Constant 0.1572*** 0.1020*** 0.1088*** 0.1207*** 
 
(11.194) (6.490) (8.303) (8.869) 
     Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.591 0.009 0.633 0.659 
Adjusted R-squared 0.589 0.003 0.631 0.656 
F-Statistic 238.766 1.456 285.017 218.908 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Given that we expect a high correlation between the debt-to-equity ratio and equity-to-assets, we also test 
CoreCapital by removing d_e from the equation. Results remain robust and our conclusions do not change. 
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Table 11.1: Market-Based Risk (Crisis) – Idiosyncratic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of firm specific risk (idiosyncratic) on measures of noninterest income. 
Idiosyncratic risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit by calculating the volatility of 
the error term (eit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as 
an interaction term with our main independent variables. The crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 
to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addi-
tion to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securi-
tization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are 
scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio 
(d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Idiosyncratic 
          
non_ii 0.0148** 
   
 
(2.367) 
   non_iicrisis -0.0323*** 
   
 
(-4.248) 
   insurance 
 
-0.0073 
 
-0.0377 
  
(-0.292) 
 
(-1.355) 
insurance_crisis 
 
-0.1067 
 
-0.1038 
  
(-0.795) 
 
(-0.778) 
i_banking 
  
0.0121** 0.0100 
   
(2.015) (1.576) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
-0.0256*** -0.0256*** 
   
(-4.171) (-4.070) 
service_charge 
   
-0.4963*** 
    
(-4.493) 
trading 
   
-0.0027 
    
(-0.017) 
securitization 
   
0.0870*** 
    
(2.825) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0414 
    
(0.928) 
d_e 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006** 0.0007*** 
 
(2.631) (2.840) (2.550) (2.808) 
ln_asset -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(-0.568) (-0.309) (-0.487) (-0.649) 
crisis 0.0205*** 0.0198*** 0.0199*** 0.0201*** 
 
(14.961) (14.944) (15.187) (14.933) 
Constant 0.0106 0.0090 0.0104 0.0128 
 
(1.440) (1.177) (1.398) (1.584) 
     Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.427 0.424 0.426 0.442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.423 0.420 0.421 0.434 
F-Statistic 105.383 104.032 104.604 50.499 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 11.2: Market-Based Risk (Crisis) – Systematic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of market risk (Beta) on measures of noninterest income. Systematic 
risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient for daily market returns 
(βM). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), in-
surance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as an interac-
tion term with our main independent variables. The crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, 
and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to 
insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization 
(securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled 
by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), 
and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Beta 
          
non_ii 1.7614*** 
   
 
(4.547) 
   non_iicrisis -1.4103*** 
   
 
(-3.525) 
   insurance 
 
-1.4510 
 
-2.8997* 
  
(-0.867) 
 
(-1.693) 
insurance_crisis 
 
2.4553 
 
2.2156 
  
(0.556) 
 
(0.512) 
i_banking 
  
1.7058*** 1.5002*** 
   
(4.180) (3.822) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
-1.3253*** -1.1828*** 
   
(-3.335) (-2.842) 
service_charge 
   
-21.2506*** 
    
(-4.100) 
trading 
   
10.2894 
    
(1.582) 
securitization 
   
5.7273* 
    
(1.872) 
other_nonii 
   
-1.4960 
    
(-0.686) 
d_e 0.0170*** 0.0089 0.0159*** 0.0185*** 
 
(3.029) (1.505) (2.666) (3.274) 
ln_asset 0.0115 0.0165 0.0166 0.0106 
 
(0.889) (1.229) (1.290) (0.790) 
crisis 0.6876*** 0.6339*** 0.6539*** 0.6526*** 
 
(18.528) (17.067) (18.178) (17.813) 
Constant 0.5286* 0.5458* 0.4543 0.6580** 
 
(1.718) (1.693) (1.474) (2.036) 
     Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.348 0.331 0.345 0.373 
Adjusted R-squared 0.344 0.326 0.340 0.364 
F-Statistic 75.461 69.787 74.209 37.933 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 11.3: Market-Based Risk (Crisis) – Total Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of stock price volatility (StdDev) on measures of noninterest income. 
Total risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns (Rit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as 
an interaction term with our main independent variables. The crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 
to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addi-
tion to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securi-
tization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are 
scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio 
(d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES StdDev 
          
non_ii 0.0204** 
   
 
(2.578) 
   non_iicrisis -0.0320*** 
   
 
(-2.603) 
   insurance 
 
-0.0202 
 
-0.0539 
  
(-0.638) 
 
(-1.543) 
insurance_crisis 
 
-0.0462 
 
-0.0440 
  
(-0.249) 
 
(-0.237) 
i_banking 
  
0.0176** 0.0145* 
   
(2.222) (1.752) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
-0.0254** -0.0246** 
   
(-2.156) (-2.043) 
service_charge 
   
-0.5515*** 
    
(-4.040) 
trading 
   
0.0381 
    
(0.176) 
securitization 
   
0.0954** 
    
(2.282) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0504 
    
(0.912) 
d_e 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0006** 
 
(2.234) (2.210) (2.150) (2.374) 
ln_asset 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(0.337) (0.547) (0.460) (0.205) 
crisis 0.0281*** 0.0272*** 0.0274*** 0.0275*** 
 
(17.232) (17.169) (17.564) (17.156) 
Constant 0.0057 0.0045 0.0051 0.0085 
 
(0.589) (0.457) (0.527) (0.805) 
     Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.491 0.489 0.490 0.502 
Adjusted R-squared 0.488 0.485 0.487 0.494 
F-Statistic 136.439 135.115 135.813 64.221 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
  
69 
 
Table 11.4: Market-Based Risk (Crisis) – Interest Rate Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of interest rate risk (IRRisk) on measures of noninterest income. Inter-
est rate risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient on the daily returns 
of the equally weighted CRSP index (βI). The first three specifications test our primary independent vari-
ables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). We 
include a crisis dummy as an interaction term with our main independent variables. The crisis dummy takes 
a value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests several components of 
noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges 
(service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest 
income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as 
the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is in-
cluded. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES IRRisk 
          
non_ii 1.2966* 
   
 
(1.724) 
   non_iicrisis -1.6026 
   
 
(-1.289) 
   insurance 
 
6.3557*** 
 
5.7356** 
  
(3.324) 
 
(2.357) 
insurance_crisis 
 
1.7880 
 
0.5879 
  
(0.396) 
 
(0.132) 
i_banking 
  
0.9069 0.7567 
   
(1.263) (0.963) 
service_charge 
   
-7.1676 
    
(-0.539) 
trading 
   
8.8572 
    
(0.493) 
trading_crisis 
   
-116.9910*** 
    
(-2.847) 
securitization 
   
5.9318 
    
(1.479) 
other_nonii 
   
-4.8729 
    
(-0.651) 
d_e 0.0547** 0.0470* 0.0537** 0.0518* 
 
(2.099) (1.943) (2.050) (1.829) 
ln_asset -0.1572*** -0.1622*** -0.1536*** -0.1679*** 
 
(-3.573) (-3.625) (-3.559) (-3.634) 
crisis -0.1428 -0.1943 -0.1834 -0.1075 
 
(-0.930) (-1.279) (-1.240) (-0.717) 
Constant 3.0464*** 3.2730*** 3.0023*** 3.3962*** 
 
(3.139) (3.199) (3.094) (3.229) 
     Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.062 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.058 
F-Statistic 7.465 7.452 7.294 4.209 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 12.1: Operational Efficiency (Crisis) – Operational Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio total salaries and benefits to number of full-time employees 
(Operational_Risk) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary inde-
pendent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities 
(i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as an interaction term with our main independent variables. The 
crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests sev-
eral components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trad-
ing), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Operational_Risk 
          
non_ii 0.1033*** 
   
 
(6.588) 
   non_iicrisis -0.0008 
   
 
(-0.029) 
   insurance 
 
-0.6988*** 
 
-0.6940*** 
  
(-5.293) 
 
(-5.290) 
insurance_crisis 
 
0.0130 
 
0.0069 
  
(0.086) 
 
(0.051) 
i_banking 
  
0.1518*** 0.1063*** 
   
(8.330) (5.841) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
-0.0293 -0.0010 
   
(-0.898) (-0.022) 
service_charge 
   
-1.8747*** 
    
(-4.033) 
trading 
   
3.5469*** 
    
(3.063) 
securitization 
   
-0.1392 
    
(-1.249) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0285 
    
(0.188) 
d_e -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(-3.806) (-3.800) (-3.789) (-4.398) 
ln_asset 0.0070*** 0.0078*** 0.0073*** 0.0064*** 
 
(6.925) (7.517) (7.369) (6.429) 
crisis 0.0119*** 0.0115*** 0.0117*** 0.0113*** 
 
(6.125) (5.711) (6.030) (6.012) 
Constant -0.0981*** -0.1136*** -0.1032*** -0.0756*** 
 
(-4.263) (-4.793) (-4.552) (-3.393) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.089 0.086 0.093 0.172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.084 0.091 0.167 
F-Statistic 35.443 34.466 37.372 34.292 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 12.2: Operational Efficiency (Crisis) – Net Income to Employee Salary 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio net income to total salaries and benefits (In-
come_EmpSalary) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary inde-
pendent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities 
(i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as an interaction term with our main independent variables. The 
crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests sev-
eral components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trad-
ing), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Income_EmpSalary 
          
non_ii 0.4936 
   
 
(0.730) 
   non_iicrisis 3.6457*** 
   
 
(2.837) 
   insurance 
 
-4.4290 
 
-3.7742 
  
(-0.527) 
 
(-0.453) 
insurance_crisis 
 
13.2680 
 
10.7826 
  
(1.165) 
 
(0.986) 
i_banking 
  
-1.0141 -0.9924 
   
(-1.170) (-1.064) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
3.4587*** 3.0839*** 
   
(3.853) (3.061) 
service_charge 
   
-30.5252 
    
(-1.019) 
trading 
   
-17.1154 
    
(-0.856) 
securitization 
   
-15.7320 
    
(-0.960) 
other_nonii 
   
51.5183 
    
(1.493) 
d_e 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(1.602) (1.053) (1.199) (1.999) 
ln_asset 0.0069 0.0117 0.0114 -0.0296* 
 
(0.333) (0.482) (0.529) (-1.883) 
crisis -1.1335*** -1.0834*** -1.0846*** -1.1009*** 
 
(-7.840) (-6.917) (-7.099) (-6.688) 
Constant 0.8335** 0.7381 0.7433* 1.5595*** 
 
(2.101) (1.639) (1.832) (3.849) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.017 0.163 0.016 0.026 
Adjusted R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.020 
F-Statistic 6.277 6.031 6.105 4.464 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 12.3: Operational Efficiency (Crisis) – Noninterest Expense to Noninterest 
Revenue 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio noninterest expense to noninterest revenue (NonIE_NonIR) 
on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; 
noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). ). We in-
clude a crisis dummy as an interaction term with our main independent variables. The crisis dummy takes a 
value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests several components of 
noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges 
(service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest 
income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as 
the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is in-
cluded. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES NonIE_NonIR 
          
non_ii -14.4883*** 
   
 
(-3.771) 
   non_iicrisis 2.5069 
   
 
(0.449) 
   insurance 
 
-17.7853* 
 
-34.8579*** 
  
(-1.951) 
 
(-2.639) 
insurance_crisis 
 
-10.9706 
 
-9.5971 
  
(-0.721) 
 
(-0.710) 
i_banking 
  
-6.0285*** -3.9346* 
   
(-7.029) (-1.788) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
1.0536 -1.3762 
   
(0.927) (-0.213) 
service_charge 
   
-106.7470*** 
    
(-3.705) 
trading 
   
-505.6579* 
    
(-1.687) 
securitization 
   
-22.2194*** 
    
(-3.377) 
other_nonii 
   
-46.5004*** 
    
(-5.284) 
d_e 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.811) (0.844) (0.837) (1.211) 
ln_asset -0.3025*** -0.3315*** -0.3443*** -0.1561 
 
(-2.889) (-3.140) (-3.352) (-0.983) 
crisis 0.5336 0.6251** 0.6128** 0.5895** 
 
(1.628) (2.225) (2.212) (2.161) 
Constant 9.9052*** 10.2962*** 10.5977*** 7.1869** 
 
(4.068) (4.173) (4.399) (2.039) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.029 0.018 0.019 0.082 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.015 0.016 0.076 
F-Statistic 10.722 6.618 7.031 14.742 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 13.1: Intermediation Efficiency (Crisis) – Net Interest Margin 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio net interest income divided by held-to-maturity securities, 
available-for-sale securities, and loans and leases (NIM) on measures of noninterest income. The first three 
specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (in-
surance), and securities activities (i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as an interaction term with our 
main independent variables. The crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. 
The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and 
i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), 
and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. 
In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural 
logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES NIM 
          
non_ii 0.0319* 
   
 
(1.658) 
   non_iicrisis 0.0051 
   
 
(0.182) 
   insurance 
 
0.3544*** 
 
0.3277*** 
  
(2.915) 
 
(3.140) 
insurance_crisis 
 
-0.3464** 
 
-0.2877** 
  
(-2.531) 
 
(-2.385) 
i_banking 
  
-0.0170 -0.0118 
   
(-1.463) (-0.998) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
0.0559** 0.0516* 
   
(2.214) (1.961) 
service_charge 
   
0.1316 
    
(1.551) 
trading 
   
0.1199 
    
(0.183) 
securitization 
   
0.6209*** 
    
(4.983) 
other_nonii 
   
0.1664** 
    
(2.254) 
d_e -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(-3.948) (-3.954) (-3.930) (-3.923) 
ln_asset 0.0020*** 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0015** 
 
(3.135) (2.973) (3.392) (2.107) 
crisis dummy -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0023* -0.0015 
 
(-1.583) (-1.337) (-1.886) (-1.208) 
Constant -0.0070 -0.0054 -0.0087 0.0037 
 
(-0.480) (-0.356) (-0.605) (0.237) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.031 0.033 0.030 0.070 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029 0.030 0.027 0.064 
F-Statistic 11.768 12.279 11.185 12.340 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
  
74 
 
Table 13.2: Intermediation Efficiency (Crisis) – Return on Loan 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio interest and fee income from loans to total loans and leases 
(Return_Loan) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independ-
ent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities 
(i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as an interaction term with our main independent variables. The 
crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests sev-
eral components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trad-
ing), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Return_Loan 
          
non_ii 0.1512*** 
   
 
(5.790) 
   non_iicrisis -0.1242*** 
   
 
(-3.252) 
   insurance 
 
0.3825 
 
0.2771 
  
(1.583) 
 
(1.501) 
insurance_crisis 
 
-0.5190** 
 
-0.3859** 
  
(-2.065) 
 
(-2.077) 
i_banking 
  
0.0958*** 0.1125*** 
   
(4.492) (5.404) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
-0.0583* -0.0741** 
   
(-1.682) (-2.272) 
service_charge 
   
-0.0726 
    
(-0.723) 
trading 
   
-1.3200*** 
    
(-3.814) 
securitization 
   
1.4554*** 
    
(4.367) 
other_nonii 
   
0.1507* 
    
(1.701) 
d_e -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(-0.717) (-0.741) (-0.727) (-0.422) 
ln_asset 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0001 
 
(0.569) (1.086) (1.343) (-0.146) 
crisis dummy -0.0008 -0.0029*** -0.0032*** -0.0018* 
 
(-0.726) (-2.787) (-2.955) (-1.832) 
Constant 0.0599*** 0.0575*** 0.0546*** 0.0686*** 
 
(5.792) (5.644) (5.306) (6.457) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.037 0.011 0.017 0.148 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 0.009 0.014 0.143 
F-Statistic 14.069 4.179 6.352 28.619 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
  
75 
 
Table 13.3: Intermediation Efficiency (Crisis) – Credit Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio loans past due and not accruing to total loans and leases 
(Credit_Risk) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independ-
ent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities 
(i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as an interaction term with our main independent variables. The 
crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests sev-
eral components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trad-
ing), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Credit_Risk 
          
non_ii 0.0050 
   
 
(0.444) 
   non_iicrisis -0.0695*** 
   
 
(-2.872) 
   insurance 
 
0.1313 
 
0.0486 
  
(0.556) 
 
(0.243) 
insurance_crisis 
 
-0.6526* 
 
-0.5817* 
  
(-1.953) 
 
(-1.892) 
i_banking 
  
-0.0206*** -0.0189*** 
   
(-4.238) (-4.339) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
-0.0336*** -0.0397*** 
   
(-3.749) (-4.056) 
service_charge 
   
-0.6156*** 
    
(-3.329) 
trading 
   
-0.5460* 
    
(-1.731) 
securitization 
   
0.6284* 
    
(1.677) 
other_nonii 
   
0.1410 
    
(0.709) 
d_e 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
(8.431) (8.496) (8.517) (8.213) 
ln_asset 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0014*** 
 
(3.979) (4.175) (3.897) (2.970) 
crisis dummy 0.0234*** 0.0228*** 0.0223*** 0.0233*** 
 
(12.949) (13.027) (12.598) (13.498) 
Constant -0.0313*** -0.0316*** -0.0304*** -0.0205* 
 
(-3.032) (-3.158) (-2.938) (-1.928) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.128 0.128 0.127 0.150 
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 0.125 0.125 0.145 
F-Statistic 53.583 53.281 53.230 29.195 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 13.4: Intermediation Efficiency (Crisis) – Loan Loss Reserve Ratio 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio provision for loan and leases loss to total assets (LLRR) on 
measures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; non-
interest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). We include a 
crisis dummy as an interaction term with our main independent variables. The crisis dummy takes a value 
of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests several components of noninter-
est income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (ser-
vice_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest 
income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as 
the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is in-
cluded. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES LLRR 
          
non_ii 0.0222** 
   
 
(2.141) 
   non_iicrisis -0.0410*** 
   
 
(-3.491) 
   insurance 
 
0.0051 
 
-0.0135 
  
(0.167) 
 
(-0.680) 
insurance_crisis 
 
-0.2205*** 
 
-0.1975*** 
  
(-4.635) 
 
(-4.824) 
i_banking 
  
-0.0071*** -0.0050*** 
   
(-4.618) (-3.194) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
-0.0137*** -0.0169*** 
   
(-4.316) (-4.185) 
service_charge 
   
-0.1041* 
    
(-1.835) 
trading 
   
-0.1187 
    
(-0.999) 
securitization 
   
0.2662*** 
    
(6.051) 
other_nonii 
   
0.2249*** 
    
(7.000) 
d_e -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(-7.715) (-7.726) (-7.990) (-5.765) 
ln_asset 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0002* 
 
(3.747) (4.337) (4.053) (1.856) 
crisis dummy 0.0089*** 0.0084*** 0.0082*** 0.0086*** 
 
(15.406) (15.287) (15.125) (15.979) 
Constant -0.0086*** -0.0100*** -0.0091*** -0.0034 
 
(-2.910) (-3.336) (-3.029) (-1.157) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.162 0.159 0.159 0.230 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.157 0.157 0.225 
F-Statistic 70.692 68.883 68.792 49.324 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 14.1: Liquidity and Capital Adequacy (Crisis) – Liquidity Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio core deposits (NOW, ATS, time deposits, and other trans-
action accounts) to total assets (Liquidity_Risk) on measures of noninterest income. The first three specifi-
cations test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), 
and securities activities (i_banking). We include a crisis dummy as an interaction term with our main inde-
pendent variables. The crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The 
fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking 
jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other 
noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all re-
gressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural loga-
rithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is included. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Liquidity_Risk 
          
non_ii -0.4139*** 
   
 
(-8.699) 
   non_iicrisis 0.0815 
   
 
(1.261) 
   insurance 
 
-0.8602*** 
 
-0.8309*** 
  
(-4.194) 
 
(-4.011) 
insurance_crisis 
 
0.0305 
 
0.0477 
  
(0.099) 
 
(0.168) 
i_banking 
  
-0.4643*** -0.4011*** 
   
(-8.992) (-7.584) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
0.0936 0.0619 
   
(1.345) (0.829) 
service_charge 
   
3.7531*** 
    
(3.075) 
trading 
   
-4.5189*** 
    
(-5.117) 
securitization 
   
0.1516 
    
(0.388) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0173 
    
(0.064) 
d_e 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
(12.786) (12.512) (12.326) (13.055) 
ln_asset -0.0310*** -0.0317*** -0.0321*** -0.0295*** 
 
(-27.437) (-27.031) (-28.077) (-25.286) 
crisis 0.0254*** 0.0278*** 0.0276*** 0.0279*** 
 
(5.108) (5.840) (5.933) (5.885) 
Constant 0.8809*** 0.8885*** 0.8999*** 0.8275*** 
 
(32.058) (31.364) (32.435) (28.746) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.260 0.243 0.261 0.294 
Adjusted R-squared 0.258 0.241 0.259 0.290 
F-Statistic 128.343 117.067 128.394 68.841 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 14.2: Liquidity and Capital Adequacy (Crisis) – Core Capital 
This table presents OLS regressions of the ratio total equity capital to total assets (CoreCapital) on meas-
ures of noninterest income. The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest 
income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). We include a crisis 
dummy as an interaction term with our main independent variables. The crisis dummy takes a value of 1 in 
years 2007 to 2009, and zero otherwise. The fourth regression tests several components of noninterest in-
come in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (ser-
vice_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest 
income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank characteristics such as 
the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). A crisis dummy is in-
cluded. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES CoreCapital 
          
non_ii 1.1161*** 
   
 
(14.076) 
   non_iicrisis -0.1106 
   
 
(-0.848) 
   insurance 
 
-0.2532** 
 
-0.1642** 
  
(-2.560) 
 
(-2.003) 
insurance_crisis 
 
-0.2236 
 
-0.2443* 
  
(-1.133) 
 
(-1.726) 
i_banking 
  
1.3280*** 1.3395*** 
   
(23.107) (23.651) 
i_bankingcrisis 
  
-0.2076* -0.2193** 
   
(-1.883) (-1.985) 
service_charge 
   
-0.1105 
    
(-0.623) 
trading 
   
-0.8737* 
    
(-1.768) 
securitization 
   
1.3964*** 
    
(7.958) 
other_nonii 
   
0.2438* 
    
(1.927) 
d_e -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(-34.912) (-21.718) (-23.948) (-17.891) 
ln_asset -0.0042*** -0.0006 -0.0011** -0.0017*** 
 
(-7.218) (-0.987) (-2.157) (-3.075) 
crisis 0.0067*** 0.0019 0.0025 0.0037** 
 
(2.620) (0.673) (1.583) (2.334) 
Constant 0.1686*** 0.1078*** 0.1154*** 0.1274*** 
 
(12.789) (7.712) (9.360) (9.803) 
     Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R-Squared 0.588 0.007 0.635 0.661 
Adjusted R-squared 0.587 0.004 0.634 0.659 
F-Statistic 519.630 2.505 635.225 322.461 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 15.1: Market-Based Risk (Weekly Returns) – Idiosyncratic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of firm specific risk (idiosyncratic) on measures of noninterest income. 
Idiosyncratic risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit by calculating the volatility of 
the error term (eit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests 
several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income 
(trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Idiosyncratic 
          
non_ii -0.0006 
   
 
(-0.043) 
   insurance 
 
-0.1508** 
 
-0.2308*** 
  
(-2.121) 
 
(-3.070) 
i_banking 
  
0.0008 -0.0026 
   
(0.057) (-0.161) 
service_charge 
   
-1.0765*** 
    
(-5.037) 
trading 
   
-0.5653 
    
(-1.579) 
securitization 
   
0.1733*** 
    
(2.832) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0934 
    
(0.875) 
d_e 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 
 
(2.961) (3.390) (2.962) (3.533) 
ln_asset -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 
(-0.443) (-0.110) (-0.452) (-0.237) 
Constant 0.0320*** 0.0273** 0.0319*** 0.0319*** 
 
(2.757) (2.294) (2.750) (2.601) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.614 0.616 0.614 0.633 
Adjusted R-squared 0.608 0.610 0.608 0.625 
F-Statistic 101.422 102.015 101.422 74.993 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 15.2: Market-Based Risk (Weekly Returns) – Systematic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of market risk (Beta) on measures of noninterest income. Systematic 
risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient for daily market returns 
(βM). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), in-
surance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests several com-
ponents of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), ser-
vice charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). 
All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank charac-
teristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year 
dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Beta 
          
non_ii 1.0665*** 
   
 
(4.560) 
   insurance 
 
-0.3643 
 
-2.3120 
  
(-0.229) 
 
(-1.432) 
i_banking 
  
1.0521*** 0.9202*** 
   
(4.253) (3.757) 
service_charge 
   
-23.8601*** 
    
(-4.451) 
trading 
   
-1.6474 
    
(-0.187) 
securitization 
   
4.9843** 
    
(2.464) 
other_nonii 
   
-0.9934 
    
(-0.440) 
d_e 0.0181*** 0.0110* 0.0174*** 0.0202*** 
 
(3.288) (1.926) (3.009) (3.497) 
ln_asset 0.0428*** 0.0459*** 0.0466*** 0.0439*** 
 
(3.019) (3.094) (3.296) (2.884) 
Constant -0.7405** -0.7093** -0.8011** -0.6575* 
 
(-2.181) (-1.971) (-2.351) (-1.794) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.402 0.392 0.401 0.427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.393 0.382 0.392 0.414 
F-Statistic 42.862 41.005 42.616 32.423 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 15.3: Market-Based Risk (Weekly Returns) – Total Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of stock price volatility (StdDev) on measures of noninterest income. 
Total risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns (Rit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests 
several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income 
(trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES StdDev 
          
non_ii 0.0147 
   
 
(1.158) 
   insurance 
 
-0.1111** 
 
-0.2126*** 
  
(-2.004) 
 
(-3.415) 
i_banking 
  
0.0168 0.0119 
   
(1.212) (0.774) 
service_charge 
   
-1.2836*** 
    
(-5.099) 
trading 
   
-0.6880 
    
(-1.388) 
securitization 
   
0.2006*** 
    
(3.568) 
other_nonii 
   
0.0757 
    
(0.623) 
d_e 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 
 
(3.264) (3.265) (3.228) (3.812) 
ln_asset 0.0011 0.0013* 0.0012* 0.0013* 
 
(1.629) (1.823) (1.726) (1.702) 
Constant 0.0023 -0.0005 0.0013 0.0028 
 
(0.147) (-0.033) (0.079) (0.163) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.700 
Adjusted R-squared 0.679 0.679 0.679 0.693 
F-Statistic 137.704 137.745 137.746 101.155 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 15.4: Market-Based Risk (Weekly Returns) – Interest Rate Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of interest rate risk (IRRisk) on measures of noninterest income. Inter-
est rate risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient on the daily returns 
of the equally weighted CRSP index (βI). The first three specifications test our primary independent vari-
ables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The 
fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking 
jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other 
noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all re-
gressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural loga-
rithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES IRRisk 
          
non_ii 1.0246 
   
 
(0.403) 
   insurance 
 
18.9373 
 
11.6776 
  
(1.517) 
 
(0.806) 
i_banking 
  
1.1442 1.4366 
   
(0.416) (0.501) 
service_charge 
   
-11.7051 
    
(-0.231) 
trading 
   
-167.7002*** 
    
(-3.308) 
securitization 
   
17.4312 
    
(1.177) 
other_nonii 
   
-17.3413 
    
(-0.603) 
d_e 0.1845 0.1694 0.1847 0.1938 
 
(1.431) (1.423) (1.427) (1.380) 
ln_asset -0.5273*** -0.5470*** -0.5235*** -0.4975*** 
 
(-3.861) (-4.038) (-3.930) (-3.775) 
Constant 10.7751*** 11.4020*** 10.7038*** 10.2855*** 
 
(3.845) (3.881) (3.824) (3.647) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 712 712 712 712 
R-Squared 0.062 0.063 0.062 0.072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.051 
F-Statistic 4.196 4.255 4.197 3.371 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 16.1: Market-Based Risk (Outliers) – Idiosyncratic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of firm specific risk (idiosyncratic) on measures of noninterest income. 
Idiosyncratic risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit by calculating the volatility of 
the error term (eit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests 
several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income 
(trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Idiosyncratic 
          
non_ii 0.0017 
   
 
(0.661) 
   insurance 
 
0.0198 
 
-0.0050 
  
(1.610) 
 
(-0.381) 
i_banking 
  
-0.0002 -0.0020 
   
(-0.080) (-0.787) 
service_charge 
   
-0.3517*** 
    
(-6.044) 
trading 
   
0.0678 
    
(0.975) 
securitization 
   
0.0961*** 
    
(4.622) 
other_nonii 
   
-0.0438** 
    
(-2.559) 
d_e 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 
 
(3.447) (3.287) (3.061) (4.203) 
ln_asset -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** 
 
(-5.063) (-5.146) (-5.028) (-6.316) 
Constant 0.0287*** 0.0293*** 0.0288*** 0.0326*** 
 
(10.569) (10.598) (10.566) (11.964) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 638 638 638 638 
R-Squared 0.650 0.650 0.649 0.696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643 0.644 0.643 0.688 
F-Statistic 105.516 105.630 105.429 88.810 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 16.2: Market-Based Risk (Outliers) – Systematic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of market risk (Beta) on measures of noninterest income. Systematic 
risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient for daily market returns 
(βM). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), in-
surance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests several com-
ponents of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), ser-
vice charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). 
All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank charac-
teristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year 
dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Beta 
          
non_ii 1.2816*** 
   
 
(5.895) 
   insurance 
 
-0.4087 
 
-1.7301* 
  
(-0.418) 
 
(-1.722) 
i_banking 
  
1.1756*** 1.0650*** 
   
(5.306) (4.477) 
service_charge 
   
-19.2803*** 
    
(-4.121) 
trading 
   
17.8947*** 
    
(2.861) 
securitization 
   
6.9867*** 
    
(2.768) 
other_nonii 
   
-3.3450* 
    
(-1.924) 
d_e 0.0190*** 0.0084 0.0174*** 0.0214*** 
 
(3.219) (1.345) (2.699) (3.721) 
ln_asset -0.0147 -0.0105 -0.0099 -0.0211* 
 
(-1.284) (-0.867) (-0.861) (-1.901) 
Constant 0.8827*** 0.9330*** 0.8152*** 1.1167*** 
 
(3.201) (3.185) (2.936) (4.078) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 638 638 638 638 
R-Squared 0.339 0.311 0.332 0.387 
Adjusted R-squared 0.327 0.299 0.320 0.372 
F-Statistic 29.122 25.740 28.279 24.543 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 16.3: Market-Based Risk (Outliers) – Total Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of stock price volatility (StdDev) on measures of noninterest income. 
Total risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns (Rit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests 
several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income 
(trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES StdDev 
          
non_ii 0.0095*** 
   
 
(3.369) 
   insurance 
 
0.0131 
 
-0.0154 
  
(1.012) 
 
(-1.133) 
i_banking 
  
0.0075*** 0.0054* 
   
(2.699) (1.807) 
service_charge 
   
-0.3940*** 
    
(-5.839) 
trading 
   
0.1362* 
    
(1.706) 
securitization 
   
0.1171*** 
    
(4.752) 
other_nonii 
   
-0.0544** 
    
(-2.463) 
d_e 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 
(3.382) (2.401) (2.907) (4.177) 
ln_asset -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** 
 
(-3.228) (-3.015) (-2.981) (-4.223) 
Constant 0.0277*** 0.0285*** 0.0273*** 0.0319*** 
 
(7.961) (7.856) (7.799) (9.300) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 638 638 638 638 
R-Squared 0.756 0.754 0.755 0.788 
Adjusted R-squared 0.752 0.749 0.751 0.782 
F-Statistic 176.658 174.005 175.426 143.851 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 16.4: Market-Based Risk (Outliers) – Interest Rate Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of interest rate risk (IRRisk) on measures of noninterest income. Inter-
est rate risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient on the daily returns 
of the equally weighted CRSP index (βI). The first three specifications test our primary independent vari-
ables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The 
fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking 
jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other 
noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all re-
gressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural loga-
rithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES IRRisk 
          
non_ii -0.6186 
   
 
(-1.429) 
   insurance 
 
4.5498** 
 
3.6567* 
  
(2.552) 
 
(1.879) 
i_banking 
  
-0.6347 -0.6374 
   
(-1.396) (-1.581) 
service_charge 
   
-3.5585 
    
(-0.427) 
trading 
   
-29.2165** 
    
(-2.350) 
securitization 
   
-2.1593 
    
(-1.265) 
other_nonii 
   
0.1427 
    
(0.085) 
d_e -0.0034 0.0002 -0.0031 -0.0042 
 
(-0.471) (0.027) (-0.445) (-0.562) 
ln_asset -0.0439*** -0.0507*** -0.0462*** -0.0382** 
 
(-2.910) (-3.287) (-3.087) (-2.398) 
Constant 1.1562*** 1.2567*** 1.1963*** 1.0599*** 
 
(3.136) (3.294) (3.223) (2.791) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 638 638 638 638 
R-Squared 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.159 
F-Statistic 11.004 10.994 10.990 8.506 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 17.1: Market-Based Risk (Lagged Dependent) – Idiosyncratic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of firm specific risk (idiosyncratic) on measures of noninterest income. 
Idiosyncratic risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit by calculating the volatility of 
the error term (eit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests 
several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income 
(trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Lag_Idiosyncratic 
          
non_ii 0.0068 
   
 
(1.497) 
   insurance 
 
0.0013 
 
-0.0236 
  
(0.052) 
 
(-0.895) 
i_banking 
  
0.0062 0.0041 
   
(1.243) (0.796) 
service_charge 
   
-0.3708*** 
    
(-5.463) 
trading 
   
0.0994 
    
(0.611) 
securitization 
   
0.1149*** 
    
(4.942) 
other_nonii 
   
-0.0130 
    
(-0.479) 
d_e 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 
(2.891) (2.784) (2.807) (2.951) 
ln_asset -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** 
 
(-2.831) (-2.860) (-2.781) (-3.582) 
Constant 0.0228*** 0.0232*** 0.0225*** 0.0268*** 
 
(6.460) (6.426) (6.376) (7.080) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 598 598 598 598 
R-Squared 0.690 0.689 0.690 0.710 
Adjusted R-squared 0.685 0.683 0.684 0.702 
F-Statistic 130.600 129.846 130.406 94.887 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 17.2: Market-Based Risk (Lagged Dependent) – Systematic Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of market risk (Beta) on measures of noninterest income. Systematic 
risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient for daily market returns 
(βM). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income (non_ii), in-
surance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests several com-
ponents of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income (trading), ser-
vice charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income (other_nonii). 
All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control for bank charac-
teristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year 
dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Lag_Beta 
          
non_ii 1.1417*** 
   
 
(5.162) 
   insurance 
 
-0.3386 
 
-1.8268 
  
(-0.309) 
 
(-1.631) 
i_banking 
  
0.9758*** 0.8453*** 
   
(4.691) (3.563) 
service_charge 
   
-22.3481*** 
    
(-4.172) 
trading 
   
16.7272*** 
    
(2.880) 
securitization 
   
8.6142*** 
    
(3.795) 
other_nonii 
   
-1.2210 
    
(-0.685) 
d_e 0.0103* 0.0026 0.0088 0.0121** 
 
(1.846) (0.445) (1.464) (2.176) 
ln_asset -0.0047 -0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0121 
 
(-0.395) (-0.167) (-0.095) (-1.023) 
Constant 0.7520*** 0.8016*** 0.7076** 1.0197*** 
 
(2.631) (2.648) (2.467) (3.556) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 598 598 598 598 
R-Squared 0.383 0.364 0.376 0.431 
Adjusted R-squared 0.372 0.353 0.366 0.416 
F-Statistic 36.414 33.590 35.437 29.334 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 17.3: Market-Based Risk (Lagged Dependent) – Total Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of stock price volatility (StdDev) on measures of noninterest income. 
Total risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns (Rit). The first three specifications test our primary independent variables; noninterest income 
(non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The fourth regression tests 
several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking jointly; trading income 
(trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other noninterest income 
(other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all regressions we control 
for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural logarithm of total assets 
(ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Lag_StdDev 
          
non_ii 0.0129*** 
   
 
(3.190) 
   insurance 
 
-0.0070 
 
-0.0346 
  
(-0.296) 
 
(-1.364) 
i_banking 
  
0.0116*** 0.0092** 
   
(2.732) (2.009) 
service_charge 
   
-0.4216*** 
    
(-5.234) 
trading 
   
0.2052 
    
(1.296) 
securitization 
   
0.1380*** 
    
(4.725) 
other_nonii 
   
-0.0176 
    
(-0.565) 
d_e 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 
 
(2.997) (2.602) (2.859) (3.160) 
ln_asset -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004* 
 
(-1.161) (-0.994) (-0.973) (-1.793) 
Constant 0.0193*** 0.0197*** 0.0187*** 0.0239*** 
 
(4.169) (4.124) (4.037) (4.958) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 598 598 598 598 
R-Squared 0.769 0.766 0.768 0.785 
Adjusted R-squared 0.765 0.762 0.764 0.779 
F-Statistic 195.214 192.420 194.485 141.676 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 17.4: Market-Based Risk (Lagged Dependent) – Interest Rate Risk 
This table presents OLS regressions of interest rate risk (IRRisk) on measures of noninterest income. Inter-
est rate risk is derived from equation (1) Rit = α + βMRMit + βIIit + eit as the coefficient on the daily returns 
of the equally weighted CRSP index (βI). The first three specifications test our primary independent vari-
ables; noninterest income (non_ii), insurance income (insurance), and securities activities (i_banking). The 
fourth regression tests several components of noninterest income in addition to insurance and i_banking 
jointly; trading income (trading), service charges (service_charge), securitization (securitization), and other 
noninterest income (other_nonii). All noninterest income components are scaled by total assets. In all re-
gressions we control for bank characteristics such as the debt to equity ratio (d_e), and the natural loga-
rithm of total assets (ln_asset). Year dummy variables are included from 2002 to 2009 but not reported. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Lag_IRRisk 
          
non_ii 0.0520 
   
 
(0.269) 
   insurance 
 
-3.8142** 
 
-3.9908** 
  
(-2.417) 
 
(-2.469) 
i_banking 
  
0.0983 0.1610 
   
(0.512) (0.823) 
service_charge 
   
0.5968 
    
(0.138) 
trading 
   
-3.9684 
    
(-0.608) 
securitization 
   
1.7275 
    
(0.888) 
other_nonii 
   
0.2766 
    
(0.255) 
d_e -0.0024 -0.0011 -0.0022 0.0010 
 
(-0.497) (-0.226) (-0.443) (0.205) 
ln_asset 0.0270*** 0.0314*** 0.0273*** 0.0313*** 
 
(3.422) (4.026) (3.473) (3.973) 
Constant -0.6775*** -0.7880*** -0.6853*** -0.8120*** 
 
(-3.696) (-4.304) (-3.730) (-4.434) 
     Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 598 598 598 598 
R-Squared 0.443 0.449 0.443 0.451 
Adjusted R-squared 0.433 0.439 0.433 0.437 
F-Statistic 46.624 47.792 46.649 31.875 
Prob(F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Noninterest Income to Operating Income 
This figure plots the aggregate annual amounts of noninterest income from all US BHCs 
as a percentage of operating income (noninterest income + net interest income).  
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Figure 2: Noninterest Income by Asset Size 
This figure depicts what proportion of operating revenue (noninterest income + interest 
income) is derived from noninterest income according to how large the BHC. The x-axis 
groups banks in percentiles based on asset size from smallest to largest. 
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Figure 3: Definitions of Dependent Variables Used to Analyze Bank Performance 
Variable Definition 
  
Market-Based Risk Measuresa 
     Firm specific risk (Idiosyncratic) Also called diversifiable it is the risk that is 
      specific to each company 
     Systematic risk (Beta) Market or un-diversifiable risk 
     Total risk (StdDev) Volatility of daily stock returns 
     Interest rate risk (IRRisk) Risk derived from fluctuations in interest rates 
  
Operational Efficiency  
     Employee expense to employees Salaries and employees’ benefits to number of full- 
          (Operational_Risk)      time employees 
     Income to employee’s salary Net income after taxes to salaries and employees’ 
          (Income_EmpSalary)      benefits 
     Noninterest expense to noninterest  Noninterest expense as a % of noninterest revenue 
          Revenue (NonIE_NonIR)  
  
Intermediation Efficiency  
     Net interest margin (NIM) Net interest income as a % of investment securities 
      and loans 
     Return on loans (Return_Loan) Interest and fees on loans to total loans and leases 
     Credit risk (Credit_Risk) Noncurrent loans to total loans and leases 
     Loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) Provision for loan and lease loss to total assets 
  
Capital Adequacy and Liquidity  
     Liquidity risk (Liquidity_Risk) Transaction deposits plus time deposits less than 
      $100,000 to total assets 
     Equity to assets (CoreCapital) Equity capital to total assets 
  
aSee equation (1) for the estimation of market-based risk measures.  
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APPENDIX C: FR Y-9C REPORTING FORM DETAILS 
 
Definitions of noninterest income variables from FR Y-9C reporting forms 
 
Line Item 5(a) Income from fiduciary activities – BHCK407019
Report gross income from services rendered by the trust departments of the bank holding 
company’s banking subsidiaries or by any of the bank holding company’s consolidated 
subsidiaries acting in any fiduciary capacity. Include commissions and fees on the sales 
of annuities by these entities that are executed in a fiduciary capacity. 
 
 
Exclude commissions and fees received for the accumulation or disbursement of funds 
deposited to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or Keogh Plan accounts when they 
are not handled by the trust departments of the holding company’s subsidiary banks (re-
port in item 5(b), ‘‘Service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices’’). 
 
Leave this item blank if the subsidiary banks of the reporting bank holding company 
have no trust departments and the bank holding company has no consolidated subsidiar-
ies that render services in any fiduciary capacity. 
 
Line Item 5(b) Service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices – BHCK4483 
Report in this item amounts charged depositors in domestic offices: 
 
(1) For the maintenance of their deposit accounts with the bank holding company or 
its consolidated subsidiaries, so-called ‘‘maintenance charges.’’ 
(2) For their failure to maintain specified minimum deposit balances. 
(3) Based on the number of checks drawn on and deposits made in their deposit ac-
counts. 
(4) For checks drawn on so-called ‘‘no minimum balance’’ deposit accounts. 
(5) For withdrawals from nontransaction deposit accounts. 
(6) For the closing of savings accounts before a specified minimum period of time 
has elapsed. 
(7) For accounts which have remained inactive for extended periods of time or which 
have become dormant. 
(8) For deposits to or withdrawals from deposit accounts through the use of auto-
mated teller machines or remote service units. 
(9) For the processing of checks drawn against insufficient funds, so-called ‘‘NSF 
check charges,’’ that the subsidiary banks of the bank holding company assess re-
gardless of whether it decides to pay, return, or hold the check. Exclude subse-
quent charges levied against overdrawn accounts based on the length of time the 
account has been overdrawn, the magnitude of the overdrawn balance, or which 
are otherwise equivalent to interest (report in the appropriate subitem of item 
1(a)(1), ‘‘Interest and fee income on loans in domestic offices’’). 
(10) For issuing stop payment orders. 
                                                 
19 Eight digit codes after each line item represent the alpha-numeric identifiers for the items listed in the FR 
Y-9C reporting forms. 
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(11) For certifying checks. 
(12) For the accumulation or disbursement of funds deposited to Individual Re-
tirement Accounts (IRAs) or Keogh Plan accounts when not handled by the trust 
departments of subsidiary banks of the reporting bank holding company. 
 
Report such commissions and fees received for accounts handled by the trust depart-
ments of the holding company’s banking subsidiaries or by other consolidated subsidiar-
ies in item 5(a), ‘‘Income from fiduciary activities.’’ 
 
Exclude penalties paid by depositors for the early withdrawal of time deposits (report in 
item 5(l), ‘‘Other noninterest income,’’ or deduct from the interest expense of the related 
category of time deposits, as appropriate). 
 
Line Item 5(c) Trading revenue – BHCKA220 
Report the net gain or loss from trading cash instruments and off-balance-sheet derivative 
contracts (including commodity contracts) that has been recognized during the calendar 
year-to-date. The amount reported in this item must equal the sum of Schedule HI, Me-
moranda item 9(a) through 9(d). 
 
Include as trading revenue: 
 
(1) Revaluation adjustments to the carrying value of cash instruments reportable in 
Schedule HC, item 5, ‘‘Trading assets,’’ and Schedule HC, item 15, ‘‘Trading 
liabilities,’’ resulting from the periodic marking to market of such instruments. 
(2) Revaluation adjustments from the periodic marking to market of interest rate, for-
eign exchange rate, commodity, and equity derivative contracts reportable in 
Schedule HC-L, item 12, ‘‘Total gross notional amount of derivative contracts 
held for trading,’’ and credit derivative contracts reportable in Schedule HC-L, 
item 7, ‘‘Credit derivatives,’’ that are held for trading purposes. The effect of the 
periodic net settlements on derivative contracts held for trading purposes should 
be included as part of the revaluation adjustments from the periodic marking to 
market of these contracts. 
(3) Incidental income and expense related to the purchase and sale of assets and lia-
bilities reportable in Schedule HC, item 5, ‘‘Trading assets,’’ and Schedule HC, 
item 15, ‘‘Trading liabilities,’’ and off-balance-sheet derivative contracts reporta-
ble in Schedule HC-L, item 12, ‘‘Total gross amount of derivative contracts held 
for trading,’’ and credit derivatives contracts reportable in Schedule HC-L, item 
7, that are held for trading purposes. 
 
If the amount to be reported in this item is a net loss, report with a minus (-) sign. 
 
Line Item 5(d) Investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and 
commissions – BHCKB490 (BHCKC886, BHCKC887, & BHCKC888)20
Report fees and commissions from underwriting (or participating in the underwriting of) 
 
                                                 
20 Definition taken from 2006 reporting forms. 
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securities, private placements of securities, investment advisory and management ser-
vices, merger and acquisition services, and other related consulting fees. Also include 
fees and commissions from securities brokerage activities, from the sale and servicing of 
mutual funds, and from the purchase and sale of securities and money market instruments 
where the bank holding company is acting as agent for other banking institutions or cus-
tomers (if these fees and commissions are not included in Schedule HI, item 5(a), “In-
come from fiduciary activities,” or item 5(c), “Trading revenue”). Include commissions 
and fees from the sale of annuities to bank holding company customers by the bank hold-
ing company’s securities brokerage subsidiary. Also include fees and commissions from 
the placement of commercial paper, both for transactions issued in the bank holding 
company’s name and transactions in which the bank holding company acts as an agent 
for a third party issuer. 
 
Also include the bank holding company’s proportionate share of the income or loss be-
fore extraordinary items and other adjustments from its investment in: 
(1) Unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
(2) Associated companies, and 
(3) Corporate joint ventures, unincorporated joint ventures, general partnerships, and 
limited partnerships over which the bank exercises significant influence 
that are principally engaged in investment banking, advisory, brokerage, or securities un-
derwriting activities. 
 
Line Item 5(e) Venture capital revenue – BHCKB491 
In general, venture capital activities involve the providing of funds, whether in the form 
of loans or equity, and technical and management assistance, when needed and requested, 
to start-up or high-risk companies specializing in new technologies, ideas, products, or 
processes. The primary objective of these investments is capital growth. 
 
Report as venture capital revenue market value adjustments, interest, dividends, gains, 
and losses (including impairment losses) on venture capital investments (loans and secur-
ities). Include any fee income from venture capital activities that is not reported in one of 
the preceding items of Schedule HI—Income Statement. 
 
Also include the bank holding company’s proportionate share of the income or loss be-
fore extraordinary items and other adjustments from its investments in: 
(1) Unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
(2) Associated companies, and 
(3) Corporate joint ventures, unincorporated joint ventures, general partnerships, and 
limited partnerships over which the bank holding company exercises significant 
influence that are principally engaged in venture capital activities. 
 
Line Item 5(f) Net servicing fees – BHCKB492 
Report income from servicing real estate mortgages, credit cards, and other financial as-
sets held by others. Report any premiums received in lieu of regular servicing fees on 
such loans only as earned over the life of the loans. For servicing assets and liabilities 
measured under the amortization method, bank holding companies should report servic-
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ing income net of the related servicing assets’ amortization expense, include impairments 
recognized on servicing assets, and also include increases in servicing liabilities recog-
nized when subsequent events have increased the fair value of the liability above its car-
rying amount. For servicing assets and liabilities remeasured at fair value under the fair 
value option, include changes in the fair value of these servicing assets and liabilities. For 
further information on servicing, see the Glossary entry for “servicing assets and liabili-
ties.” 
 
Line Item 5(g) Net securitization income – BHCKB493 
Report net gains (losses) on assets sold in the bank holding company’s own securitization 
transactions, i.e., net of transaction costs. Include unrealized losses (and recoveries of 
unrealized losses) on loans and leases held for sale in the bank holding company’s own 
securitization transactions. Report fee income from securitizations, securitization con-
duits, and structured finance vehicles, including fees for providing administrative sup-
port, liquidity support, interest rate risk management, credit enhancement support, and 
any additional support functions as an administrative agent, liquidity agent, hedging 
agent, or credit enhancement agent. Include all other fees (other than servicing fees and 
commercial paper placement fees) earned from the bank holding company’s securitiza-
tion and structured finance transactions. 
 
Exclude income from servicing securitized assets (report in item 5(f), above), fee income 
from the placement of commercial paper (report in item 5(d), above), and income from 
seller’s interests and residual interests retained by the bank holding company (report in 
the appropriate subitem of item 1, ‘‘Interest income’’). Also exclude net gains (losses) on 
loans sold to—and unrealized losses (and recoveries of unrealized losses) on loans 
and leases held for sale to—a government-sponsored agency or another institution that in 
turn securitizes the loans (report in item 5(i), ‘‘Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and 
leases’’). 
 
Line Item 5(h) Insurance commissions and fees – BHCKB494 (BHCKC386, & 
BHCKC387)21
Report the amount of premiums earned by property-casualty insurers and the amount of 
insurance premiums written by life and health insurers. Report income from insurance 
agency and brokerage operating (includes sales of annuities and supplemental contracts); 
service charges, commissions, and fees from the sale of insurance and related services; 
management fees from separate accounts, deferred annuities and universal life products. 
 
 
Also include the bank holding company’s proportionate share of the income or loss be-
fore extraordinary items and other adjustments from its investments in: 
(1) Unconsolidated subsidiaries 
(2) Associated companies, and 
(3) Corporate joint ventures, unincorporated joint ventures, general partnerships, and 
limited partnerships over which the bank holding company exercises significant 
influence 
                                                 
21 Definition taken from 2002 reporting forms. 
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that are principally engaged in insurance underwriting, reinsurance, or insurance sales 
activities. 
 
Line Item 5(i) Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases – BHCK8560 
Report the amount of net gains (losses) on sales and other disposals of loans and leases 
(reportable in Schedule HC-C), including unrealized losses (and subsequent recoveries of 
such net unrealized losses) on loans and leases held for sale. Exclude net gains (losses) 
on loans and leases sold in the bank holding company’s own securitization transactions 
and unrealized losses (and recoveries of unrealized losses) on loans and leases held for 
sale in the bank holding company’s own securitization transactions (report these gains 
(losses) in Schedule HI, item 5(g), ‘‘Net securitization income’’). 
 
Line Item 5(j) Net gains (losses) on sales of other real estate owned – BHCK8561 
Report the amount of net gains (losses) on sales and other disposals of other real estate 
owned (reportable in Schedule HC, item 7), increases and decreases in the valuation al-
lowance for foreclosed real estate, and write-downs of other real estate owned subsequent 
to acquisition (or physical possession) charged to expense. Do not include 
as a loss on other real estate owned any amount charged to the allowance for loan and 
lease losses at the time of foreclosure (actual or physical possession) for the difference 
between the carrying value of a loan and the fair value less cost to sell of the foreclosed 
real estate. 
 
Line Item 5(k) Net gains (losses) on sales of other assets (excluding securities) – 
BHCKB496 
Report the amount of net gains (losses) on sales and other disposals of assets not required 
to be reported elsewhere in the income statement (Schedule HI). Include net gains 
(losses) on sales and other disposals of premises and fixed assets; personal property ac-
quired for debts previously contracted (such as automobiles, boats, equipment, and ap-
pliances); and coins, art, and other similar assets. Do not include net gains (losses) on 
sales and other disposals of loans and leases (either directly or through securitization), 
other real estate owned, securities, and trading assets (report these net gains (losses) in 
the appropriate items of Schedule HI). 
 
Line Item 5(l) Other noninterest income – BHCKB497 
Report all operating income of the bank holding company for the calendar year to date 
not required to be reported elsewhere in Schedule HI. Disclose in Schedule HI, Memo-
randa items 6(a) through 6(j), each component of other noninterest income, and the dollar 
amount of such component, that is greater than $25,000 and exceeds 3 percent of the oth-
er noninterest income reported in this item. If net losses have been reported in 
this item for a component of ‘‘Other noninterest income,’’ use the absolute value of such 
net losses to determine whether the amount of the net losses is greater than 
$25,000 and exceeds 3 percent of ‘‘Other noninterest income’’ and should be reported in 
Schedule HI, Memoranda item 6. (The absolute value refers to the magnitude of the dol-
lar amount without regard to whether the amount represents net gains or net losses.) Pre-
printed captions have been provided in Memoranda items 6(a) through 6(g) for reporting 
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the following components of other noninterest income if the component exceeds this dis-
closure threshold: income and fees from the printing and sale of checks, earnings 
on/increase in value of cash surrender value of life insurance, income and fees from au-
tomated teller machines (ATMS), rent and other income from other real estate owned, 
safe deposit box rent, net change in the fair values of financial instruments accounted for 
under a fair value option, and bank card and credit card interchange fees. For each com-
ponent of other noninterest income that exceeds this disclosure 
threshold for which a preprinted caption has not been provided describe the component 
with a clear but concise caption in Schedule HI, Memoranda items 6(h) through 6(j). 
These descriptions should not exceed 50 characters in length (including spacing between 
words). 
 
For disclosure purposes in Schedule HI, Memoranda items 6(a) through 6(g), when com-
ponents of ‘‘Other noninterest income’’ reflect a single credit for separate ‘‘bundled ser-
vices’’ provided through third party vendors, disclose such amounts in the item with the 
preprinted caption that most closely describes the predominant type of income earned, 
and this categorization should be used consistently over time. 
 
Include as other noninterest income: 
(1) Service charges, commissions, and fees for such services as: 
a. The rental of safe deposit boxes. 
b. The safekeeping of securities for other depository institutions (if the in-
come for such safe keeping services is not included in Schedule HI, item 
5(a), ‘‘Income from fiduciary activities’’). 
c. The sale of bank drafts, money orders, cashiers’ checks, and travelers’ 
checks. 
d. The collection of utility bills, checks, notes, bond coupons, and bills of 
exchange. 
e. The redemption of U.S. savings bonds. 
f. The handling of food stamps and the U.S. Treasury Tax and Loan Ac-
count, including fees received in connection with the issuance of interest-
bearing demand notes by a depository institution that is a consolidated 
subsidiary of the reporting bank holding company. 
g. The execution of acceptances and the issuance of commercial letters of 
credit, standby letters of credit, defered payment letters of credit, and let-
ters of credit issued for cash or its equivalent. Exclude income on bankers 
acceptances and trade acceptances (report such income in the appropriate 
subitem of Schedule HI, item 1(a), ‘‘Interest and fee income on loans,’’ or 
in Schedule HI, item 1(e), ‘‘Interest income from trading assets,’’ as ap-
propriate). 
h. The notarizing of forms and documents. 
i. The negotiation or management of loans from other lenders for customers 
or correspondents. 
j. The providing of consulting and advisory services to others. Exclude in-
come from investment advisory services, which is to be reported in Sche-
dule HI, item 5(d). 
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k. The use of the bank holding company subsidiary bank’s automated teller 
machines or remote service units by depositors of other depository institu-
tions. 
(2) Income and fees from the sale and printing of checks. 
(3) Gross rentals and other income from all real estate reportable in Schedule HC, 
item 7, ‘‘Other real estate owned.’’ 
(4) Earnings on or other increases in the value of the cash surrender values of life in-
surance policies owned by the bank holding company’s subsidiary bank(s). 
(5) Annual or other periodic fees paid by holders of credit cards issued by the bank 
holding company or its consolidated subsidairies. Fees that are periodically 
charged to cardholders shall be deferred and recognized on a straight-line basis 
over the period the fee entitles the cardholder to use the card. 
(6) Charges to merchants for the bank’s handling of credit card or charge sales when 
the bank holding company does not carry the related loan accounts on its books. 
Bank holding companies may report this income net of the expenses (except sala-
ries) related to the handling of these credit card sales. 
(7) Interchange fees earned from credit card transactions. 
(8) Gross income received for performing data processing services for others. Do not 
deduct the expense of performing such services for others (report in the appropri-
ate items of noninterest expense). 
(9) Loan commitment fees that are recognized during the commitment period (i.e., 
fees retrospectively determined and fees for commitments where exercise is re-
mote) or included in income when the commitment expires and loan syndication 
fees that are not required to be deferred. Refer to the Glossary entry for ‘‘loan 
fees’’ for further information. 
(10) Service charges on deposit accounts in foreign offices. 
(11) Net tellers’ overages (shortages), net recoveries (losses) on forged checks, 
net recoveries (losses) on payment of checks over stop payment orders, and simi-
lar recurring operating gains (losses) of this type. Bank holding companies should 
consistently report these gains (losses) either in this item or in Schedule HI, item 
7(d). 
(12) Net gains (losses) from the sale or other disposal of branches (i.e., where 
the reporting bank holding company sells a branch’s assets to another depository 
institution, which assumes the deposit liabilities of the branch). Bank holding 
companies should consistently report these net gains (losses) either in this item or 
in Schedule HI, item 7(d). 
(13) Net gains (losses) from all transactions involving foreign currency or for-
eign exchange other than trading transactions. Bank holding companies should 
consistently report these net gains (losses) either in this item or in Schedule HI, 
item 7(d). 
(14) Rental fees applicable to operating leases for furniture and equipment 
rented to others. 
(15) Interest received on tax refunds. 
(16) Life insurance proceeds on policies for which the bank holding company 
or its subsidiaries are the beneficiary. 
(17) Credits resulting from litigation or other claims. 
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(18) Portions of penalties for early withdrawals of time deposits that exceed the 
interest accrued or paid on the deposit to the date of withdrawal, if material. Pe-
nalties for early withdrawals, or portions of such penalties, that represent the for-
feiture of interest accrued or paid to the date of withdrawal are a reduction of in-
terest expense and should be deducted from the gross interest expense of the ap-
propriate category of time deposits in Schedule HI, item 2(a), ‘‘Interest on depo-
sits.’’ 
(19) Interest income from advances to, or obligations of, and the bank holding 
company’s proportionate share of the income or loss before extraordinary items 
and other adjustments from its investments in: 
a. Unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
b. Associated companies, and 
c. Corporate joint ventures, unincorporated joint ventures, general partner-
ships, and limited partnerships over which the bank holding company ex-
ercises significant influence 
other than those that are principally engaged in investment banking, advisory, 
brokerage, or securites underwriting activities; venture capital activities; insur-
ance and reinsurance underwriting activities; or insurance and annunity sales ac-
tivities (the income from which should be reported in Schedule HI, items 5(d)(1) 
through 5(d)(5) and 5(e), as appropriate. Exclude the bank holding company’s 
proportionate share of material extraordinary items and other adjustments of these 
entities (report in Schedule HI, item 12, ‘‘Extraordinary items and other adjust-
ments, net of income taxes’’). 
(20) Net gains (losses on nonhedging derivative instruments held for purposes 
other than trading. Bank holding companies should consistently report these net 
gains (losses) either in this item or in Schedule HI, item 7(d). for further informa-
tion, see the Glossary entry for “derivative contracts.” 
(21) Gross income generated by securities contributed to charitable contribu-
tion Clifford Trusts. 
(22) Income from ground rents and air rights. 
(23) Revaluation adjustments to the carrying value of all assets and liabilities 
reported in Schedule HC at fair value under a fair value option (excluding servic-
ing assets and liabilities reported in Schedule HC, item 10(b), “Other intangible 
assets,” and Schedule HC, item 20, “Other liabilities,” respectively, and assets 
and liabilities reported in Schedule HC, item 5, “Trading assets,” and Schedule 
HC, item 15, “Trading liabilities,” respectively) resulting from the periodic mark-
ing of such assets and liabilities to fair value. Exclude the contractual amounts of 
interest income earned and interest expense incurred on financial assets and liabil-
ities reported at fair value under a fair value option, which should be reported in 
the appropriate interest income or interest expense items on Schedule HI. 
 
Line Item 5(m) Total noninterest income – BHCK4079 
Report the sum of items 5(a) through 5(l). 
 
 
 
